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Could flexible specialisation (FS) constitute a feasible 
trajectory for industrial development, a sustainable 
alternative to mass production, viable for LDCs1 as well as 
more developed economies? This issue has fuelled intense 
debate and much controversy in the last decade2 • South Africa 
has not remained. impervious to these developments overseas. 
Increasingly policy prescriptions regarding small-scale 
manufacturing have resonated with some of the leitmotifs so 
distinctive of the FS approach. 
One of the major conclusions flowing from the FS analysis 
is that efficiency in production is not embodied only by the 
economies of scale inherent in large scale manufacturing. The 
paradigm contends that the combination of flexibility and 
efficiency is also accessible to smaller finns in industrial 
districts, and not only to large finns. While most of the 
initial research was conducted in industrial countries, it has 
been recently expanded to the Third World as well. 
At the same time, in both developed countries and LDCs, 
the employment and growth generating potential of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have captured the attention of 
policy makers and international development agencies. So it is 
hardly surprising that FS, with its emphasis on the potential 
dynamism of SMEs has sparked so much interest:. 
For more than a century, small-scale industry has been the weak 
and ugly duckling in the mainstream of the industrialisation 
debate .... In the form of flexible specialisation, small-scale 
industry has demonstrated its econanic and political strength, 
not in times of easy growth but in times of crises. 
(Rasmussen et al,1992:2) 
In South Africa, the discourse on SMEs has largely mirrored 
that of overseas. The benefits for the country associated 
with a vibrant small business sector in tenns of employment 
1 Less Developed Countries 
2 In fact, the enthusiasm the FS paradigm has engendered in its 
exponents has only been equalled by the trenchant criticisms meted out by its 
detractors. It has variously been described as a "tour de force" 
(Phillimore,1989:8), and "a radical supply side strategy" (Hirst & Zeitlin, 
1991:43). critics have labelled it "incurably romantic" (Williams et al, 
1987, 439), and as a "utopian myth ... hinged upon partial truths, obscured 
realities and unattainable panaceas" (Amin,1988:1), an econanic justification 
of a political shift "where reformist left meets radical right in an orgy of 











generation, poverty alleviation, economic growth, industrial 
deconcentration, basic good production and other favourable 
social effects have been discussed in detail elsewhere3 • 
However, a cause for concern is that small businesses, 
and black SMEs in particular, are concentrated in the retail 
and comnercial sector (70% of all black SMEs) but are under-
represented in the manufacturing sector which accounts for 
only 19% of all black SMEs (Riley,1993). Most of these 
manufacturers are engaged in the production of soft goods (eg 
dressmakers, shoe production and repair and beer brewing), 
while hard manufacturing businesses (eg wood and processing, 
fabricated metal production etc) are comparatively rare. This 
concentration in trade and comnerce appears to be fairly 
typical of African economies. The percentage f manufacturing 
activity in South Africa is, however, significantly less than 
that of other African countries (Ruiters,1994:21). It is 
·precisely this feature of the SME landscape which provides an 
incentive to glean from the FS thesis whatever policy 
recomnendations are appropriate for South African small-scale 
industry. 
AIMS AND O&JECTIVES 
The primary aim of this paper is to attempt to apply the 
FS methodology to the furniture industry in the Western cape. 
As described in detail in the following section, the gains 
from employing this approach include "the conceptualisation of 
industrialisation as a locally embedded process, and the focus 
on network and on technological capability as essential 
elements in this process" (Aeroe,1992:16). 
A positive approach is then used to assess which aspects 
of the Western Cape furniture industry (if any) are similar to 
the industrial organisational structure which has been termed 
the small firm variant of FS. The fieldwork for the empirical 
part of the case study was carried out on a sample of 20 
furniture manufacturing concerns drawn from three clusters of 












furniture ente:rprises in Epping, Lansdowne and Blackheath. The 
criterion for the selection of these research areas was the 
existence of a critical mass of sectorally concentrated f inns 
agglomerated within a geographically compact area. A key 
objective was to attempt to isolate the influence of the 
variable "locality" on other variables such as the extent of 
cooperation, firm perf o:rmance and strategies and supplier 
relations, inter alia. 
Finally the normative implications of this variant are 
examined. Do features in the Western cape industrial landscape 
exist which suggest the potential for development of regional 
industrial clusters along FS lines? 
In order to conduct a case study broadly within the FS 
framework, it is necessary to first review the literature and 
extract testable hypotheses. Firstly the general literature on 
the FS small firm variant is reviewed. Then a survey of FS 
case studies of the furniture/woodworking sector is presented. 
The next phase is a detailed perspective on the South African 
furniture industry given as a background to the empirical 













LITERATORE REVIEW: WHAT IS FS? 
The tenn Flexible Specialisation was first coined by 
Piore and Sabel (1984) in their pathbreaking book, The Second. 
I 
Industrial Divide. Mass production (the manufacture of 
standardised goods in long runs using product specific 
machines and semi-skilled labour) requires homogenous mass 
markets and a stable economic environment to reap economies of 
scale and cover the high f i.xed cost of dedicated equipment 
(Zeitlin,1991:386). Mass production economies have therefore 
evolved institutions (such as those central to the welfare 
state) to secure a "workable match between production and 
consumption" (Piore &. Sabel,1984:4). 
Piore and Sabel (1984) then contend that the 
effectiveness of these institutions which are conducive to 
mass production have been eroded by external shocks and 
striking changes in world market conditions. The shocks story 
focuses on the oil price increases of 1973, the collapse of 
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system etc. These 
initial disruptions were amplified by the very institutions 
(eg wage-index schemes) which had fonnerly encouraged the 
spread of mass production by stabilising demand and linking 
increases in productive capacity to increases in purchasing 
power. The markets story hypothesizes that mass markets for 
standardised goods have increasingly become more saturated. 
The pattern of demand has also become more volatile, 
fragmented and discerning, with increased emphasis on product 
differentiation as the basis for competition rather than 
merely price. 
The cumulative effect of these conditions coupled with 
new advances in technology have, according to Piore and Sabel, 
favoured the emergence of an alternative industrial strategy: 
Flexible Specialisation. FS, in contrast to mass production 
aims to produce differentiated semi-customised goods as a part 
of: 
A strategy of pe:r:manent innovation: acccmnodation to ceaseless 
change rather than effort to control it. This strategy is based 
on flexible - multi-use - equipment; skilled workers and the 











restricts the fonn of ccmpetition to those favouring innovation. 
For these reasons the spread of flexible specialisation amounts 
to a revival of craft fonns of production 
(Piore & Sabel,1984:17) 
Implicit in the above definition are the convictions that 
competitive markets are not necessarily the optimal form of 
exchange and also that restrictions on competition do not 
necessarily impair productive efficiency. It is interesting to 
contrast the original narrow definition with the much expanded 
one in table 1. While retaining the original features of the 
initial formulation by Piore and Sabel, FS has come to 
encompass elements of marketing, production process 
flexibility and organisational management. 
However, like mass production, FS is not without its own 
problem areas. 'As can be seen in the above definition of FS, 
constant incremental innovation is a conspicuous feature of 
this development path. The fundamental problem which FS has to 
confront is the maintenance of this technological dynamism. 
With technological stagnation, firms may come under mounting 
competitive pressure from mass producers or lower cost 
flexible specialists, and resort to cutting costs by 
"sweating" labour and using inferior materials. In the 
original f ormul~tion the relationship between sweated labour 
and technological dynamism is described as unidirectional: 
"Sweating ... is the generic response of embattled firms ... that 
cannot innovate. It is not a strategy peculiar to endangered 
flexible specialists" (1984:264). The question of how sweated 
labour impedes technological dynamism (which reverses the 
direction of causality) has not yet been resolved. Empirical 
evidence suggests that innovation and sweated labour can 
apparently coexist quite happily (Schmitz,1990). 
Another influence which may curtail innovation is that 
specialised firms, once they have found a market niche, may 
not have an incentive to reduce production costs. Since their 
highly differentiated products may appeal only to a limited 
number of customers, cuts in production costs may not 
substantially expand the market. 
Thus some sort of competition is essential. But 
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Creating a successful industrial district involves establishing 
links of cooperation amongst f inns so that they have the 
confidence to specialise - a preregu;isite to increased productive 
efficiency in small fitmS. These links of cooperation are 
sustained by social notmS that inhibit price and wage c011petition 
within the sector and channel c011petition toward product 
innovation, design leadership and specialty niches. Knowledge and 
ideas are shared across individual finns 
{Best, 1990: 237) 
The creation of institutions capable of resolving both the 
macro and micro impediments to growth along this new 
technological trajectory is a major challenge facing FS. Piore 
and Sabel describe the four "faces" of FS as exarrples of 
institutions which successfully reconcile competition and 
cooperation. Two are la~ firm variants: first, federatedlr) 
groups of l~rge loosely allied enterprises and second, .. . f4 
internally decentralised workshops (eg those found in West 
Germany) . Third, there is the small firm variant which is the 
main focus of this paper. It takes the form of regional 
conglomerates of independent SMEs in "industrial districts" eg 
the Third Italy. Finally there is a large firm-small firm 
hybrid i.e. the 11 solar11 firms holding smaller enterprises in 
steady orbits (eg the Japanese kanban system of collaboration 
with an extensive, often local supplier network) . Figure 1 
attempts to situate these three forms of the large firm 
variant schematically within the literature. It also draws 
attention to the fact that each of these occur in backward 
versions (which possess some of the characteristics of FS but 
not certain crucial others) and leading edge versions (which 
conform most closely to the ideal type) . 
Criticisms of the FS paradigm centre on its methodology, 
definition, technological and institutional preconditions, its 
claims about changing market structure and its claims about 
mass production as well as objections to its ideological 
strategy4. Further discussion of the large firm variants and 
4 While its originators see FS as a system predicated on intra- and 
inter~firm cooperation in pursuit of camion interests, its detractors argue 
that it obscures the class struggle by nurturing the impression that the self-
employe<?- ~re all ind~pend~t, .P:i;ofi1;:making entreI?r~eurs. It has been accused 
of providing theoretical Justification of "a political shift fran a major 
concern with the experience of the underprivil~ed to a camtitment to the 
i:ealth <;>f markets" .(P?llert, 1987; 58), legitimising unemployment and 
~ec;::uri~y. The political <;>verton~s are conspicuous: "The political 











































































































































































































































the criticisrn8 levelled specifically at them are unfortunately 
beyond the scope of the paper5. Those criticisms which pertain 
directly to the small firm variant will however be discussed 
in greater detail later. The purpose of this section was to 
contextualise the small firm variant within the larger FS 
literature which has proliferated in recent years. In the 
following section we probe this branch of the literature in 
greater detail. 
THE SMALL FIRM VARIANT 
·The FS approach atterrpted to demonstrate that small-scale 
industrialisation could indeed be a viable alternative to mass 
production. This viewpoint holds that the size of srnall 
businesses does not pose an insuperable obstacle to their 
corrpetitiveness since small business could take advantage of 
new technology and market conditions to usher in a resurgence 
of the craft paradigm. This would offer workers more control 
over the labour process with renewed errphasis on broadly based 
skills. The FS thesis argues forcefully that small-scale 
industrial activity is not inevitably destined to remain at 
the periphery of the economy, but is capable of sustained 
dynamic growth, export performance and errployment generation. 
Groups of small firms acting in concert can, it claims, 
achieve levels of efficiency which are virtually unattainable 
by the individual small firm. 
In the small firm variant, FS results from the physical 
clustering of firms in the same sector and a strong interf irm 
division of labour - so that geographically and/or sectorally 
dispersed firms would not constitute this form of industrial 
organisation. 
The much vaunted exarrple of this model is the "Third 
Italy" i.e. Emilia-Romagna and Tuscany in central Italy. Here, 
reveal themselves in their convergence with enterprise capitalism's enthusiasm 
for deregulation" (Pollert,1988:66) 
f 
5 These issues are reviewed in Ajam (1993). See also Williams et al 
(1987), Pollert (1988), Best (1990), Asheim (1992), Murray (1987), Amin 












traditional industries have continued to play a significant 
role in the manufacturing economy, accounting for 46.2% of 
total employment in this sector in 1981 (Amin,1989:20). These 
traditional industries (eg furniture in Pesaro, ceramics in 
Sassuolo and knitwear in Modena) have infused age old craft 
traditions with computer based technologies. Between 1971 and 
1981, small and medium sized firms (less than 99 employees) 
increased in number by 21% and by 28. 5% in employment. These 
regions have also been export competitive, Emilia alone 
accounting for 9.4% of Italian exports in 1980 (Brusco,1982; 
Amin, 1989) . 
Emilia also had one of the highest per capita incomes in 
Italy, yet over one third of the workforce is self-employed 
and 90% of all manufacturing firms employ less than 99 
employees (Best, 1990: 204). Other examples include Jutland in 
Denmark, and Baden-Wurttemburg in South Germany. 
Much of the recent work on the small enterprise version 
of FS has built on Schmitz's selective and critical reading of 
Piore and Babel's early conceptualisation. In contrast to much 
of the info:rmal sector literature which stresses the 
individual small firm's competitiveness derived from low 
'labour costs in a deregulated environment, Schmitz argues that 
competitiveness cannot be achieved by individual small fi:rms. 
Rather, it is a function of what he te:rms collective 
efficiency. Thus "the viability of small fi:rms depends not 
just on their individual performance, but critically on the 
emergence of clusters of firms which give rise to economies of 
agglomeration" (1989:21). The small firm variant may be 
described as: 
Craft ~roduction in the shape of clusters of small firms 
producing a wide range of products for highly differentiated 
markets, constantly changing their production in response to 
changing tastes; they use flexible and widely applicable 
technology in production (versatile and general purpose machines 
and equipment; at the level of micro-regulation, the ccmbination 
of cc:mpetition with cooperation is the trigger for constant 
innovation. 
(Lyberaki,1991:44) 
The above definition clearly illustrates that collective 
efficiency arises from the combined ability of a group of 











turn is stimulated by sectoral and spatial conglomeration. 
Firms compete with each other but also complement each other 
through vertical interfirm links and horizontal collaboration. 
These networks of small firms, by capturing external economies 
of scale and economies of agglomeration are able to achieve 
efficiency and flexibility which the single firm would have 
difficulty in attaining. 6 
The idea of collective efficiency is hardly no~rel to 
industrial economics, having its intellectual roots in Alfred 
Marshall's (1891) analysis of British industrial districts. As 
Best points out 
The Marshallian notion of the industrial district goes some way 
to describing a productive system of small firms. But the source 
of stability of small firms m the Third Italy is based on more 
than specialisation and external econanies of scale. Successful 
industrial districts are in a state of continuous restructuring 
as firms seek to remain canpetitive in a world of rapid 
technological change and intense international canpetition. For 
the canpetitive edge canes from specialisation by phase within 
the product chain and, second, flexibility that results from the 
capacity of the micro production units along the production chain 
as technology advances and market conditions change. To ca:i;>ture 
these opportunities an industrial district rrn.lSt be collectively 
entrepreneurial. 
(Best, 1990: 234) 
A prominent element in Best's description are the dense 
transactional relationships which exist within communities of 
firms. These firms are typically engaged in forward and 
backward linked activities which contribute to the manufacture 
of a family of related products. In the ideal typical small 
firm model of FS, these relationships in vertically 
disaggregated production chains would be defined by relatively 
short-term contracts, with no single firm in a position of. 
permanent dominance. The production process is vertically 
disaggregated and individual firms (or, in the case of the 
large firm variant, units within large firms) specialise in a 
particular production phase. While general purpose tools and 
6 For a detailed discussion of internal and external econcmies, and 
their role in promoting vertical disintegration and the inter-firm (i.e. 
social) division of labour, see appendix 1. While econcmies of scale and scope 
are essentially quantitative in nature, econcmies of agglomeration represent 
the more qualitative attributes of innovative industrial districts. These 
pertain to "factors concerning the quality of the social milieu" 
(Asheirn,1992:54) which tend to lower transaction costs, facilitate skills 
transmission and foster innovation through an institutional capacity for 











multiskilled labour provide intra-finn flexibility, the 
productive system of finn networks is also flexible due to 
"the capacity to continually reshape the production process 
through the rearrangement of its corrponents" (Piore & 
Sabel,1984:269). 
Schmitz (1992) does however stress"that the nature of inter-
finn relationships (where firms purchase products or services 
through the market or through subcontracting) may range from 
exploitation to collaboration. The scope for conflict is 
clearly greater at the horizontal level where producers are in 
direct corrpetition for orders. Yet corrpetition does not 
preclude joint action, especially on precorrpetitive problems 
eg. the provision of sites and services etc. 
The coexistence of technologically backward sweatshops 
along side highly innovative and dynamically flexible small 
businesses, has prorrpted Spath (1992) and others to argue that 
it is not the size of the finn per se which is crucial to 
their perfonnance, rather it is their relations with other 
firms. As Sengenberger and Pyke so aptly express it "The big 
problem for small firms is not being small but being lonely" 
(1991:8). 
However, while the physical and sectoral agglomeration of 
firms and the existence of linkages are necessary for 
collective efficiency, these factors are not sufficient to 
guarantee it. The quality of these linkages are of paramount 
irrportance. These are however shaped by the institutions 
peculiar to the productive economy in a particular locality. 
Institutions such as trade associations, unions, guilds, 
cooperatives (for purchasing of inputs, marketing and securing 
credit) , and the Italian municipal government (in providing 
industrial ·infrastructure) , all facilitate the recombination 
of productive enterprises. But no single institution formally 
links productive units; cohesion derives from religious, 
ethnic or political ties7 • 
7 It is interesting to note that these clusters exhibit all the tnain 
properties of "cCXTII?lex adaptive systems" (Waldrc;:ip,19~2:145) :"It is a.network 
of tnany "agents" in I?arallel .. ,. Each agent finds itself in an environment 











The experience of the Third Italy suggests that comrrrunity 
institutions may function as enforcement mechanisms in 
business relations that deter free rider and other 
opportunistic behaviors9 (through the application of social 
sanction) . The fusion of the social and business spheres can 
lead to the "economical supply of collective goods by creating 
safeguards against the erosion of individual responsibility" 
(Best,1990:240). The comrrrunity institutionalisation of trust, 
through providing an effective monitoring system, which in a 
pure market relationship would prove prohibitively costly, can 
thus lower transaction costs. An instance of this would be 
where a subcontractor could include a proportion of defective 
parts which can only be detected after the final product has 
been in use for some time. Because the latent defects are not 
irrmediately detectable, monitoring costs would clearly be 
high. Institutionalised trust, by obviating the need for 
stringent monitoring, thus lowers transaction costs 
substantially. This together with other factors (such as 
reduced transport costs due to physical proximity, lower 
prices of inputs) etc promote vertical disintegration by 
expediting the process whereby the needs of one firm are 
matched to the special competencies of other firms in the 
network (Scott,1988; Scott & Storper,1992) 
It is also asserted that "the agglomeration of industry 
in a district generates, in time, an aptitude for industrial 
work, and this aptitude comm.micates itself to most of the 
constantly acting and reacting to what other agents are doing, control of the 
system is highly dispersed .... There are several levels of organisation with 
agents at one level serving as the building blocks for agents at a higher 
level .... Canplex adaptive systems are constantly revisin$ and rearranging 
their blocks as they gain experience. Every canplex adaptive system 
anticipates the future every canplex system is constantly making predictions 
based on its various models of the world ... canplex systems typically have 
many niches, each one of which can be exploited by an agent adapted to fill 
that niche" (ibid) . The canparison with enterprise clusters is irrmediate. 
8 a good example is the public good nature of the infonnational flows 
which foster innovation 
9 For instance, clustered manufacturers, as a group, share a corrrnon 
interest in stabilising wages and working conditions. Individually, each may 
be tempted to cheat on the standard. No producer can however afford to adhere 












people who live in the district " (Bellandi,1989:143). While a 
general "industrial atmosphere" can increase the probability 
of small f inns acquiring the requisite skills to support the 
imitation of innovative techniques invented elsewhere and 
diffusion of innovation, it is important to note that "such 
processes are strongly conditioned by the spatial proximity 
and cultural homogeneity of industrial districts" 
(Asheim,1992:54). 
The geographical proximity in agglomerations not only 
serve to diffuse technical know-how rapidly, but may also 
inspire the creation of ideas through a social process of 
information exchange and discussion, which stimulates product 
and process innovation through gradual but continuous 
modification. For instance, when one firm requires a 
specialised input or equipment, this might have to be met by 
innovative activity from its supplier finns within the network 
(Scott & Storper,1992:18). 
Thus inter-firm interaction in a process of mutual 
adjustment facilitates learning, and expands their expertise 
and capabilities. While it is relatively easy to capture 
external economies through the establishment of spatially 
concentrated production complexes, the FS thesis would submit 
that the replication of small firm industrial districts 
centres on the possibility that agglomeration economies could 
be deliberately nurtured. 
Industrial Districts 
The FS approach recornnends that policy makers focus their 
attention on groups or clusters of small firms within a wider 
sociopolitical context, rather than concentrating on the 
viability and performance of the individual, isolated firm. 
The current preoccupation with industrial districts as a 
vehicle for small-scale industrialisation within a regional 
development context has initiated a whole new research agenda. 
Sengenberger and Pyke's (1991) investigation of 
innovative European industrial districts indicates that the 











success sterns not from advantageous access to low cost factors 
of production (i.e. cheap labour, land or capital), but rather 
from a particularly effective social and economic organisation 
based on small firms (i.e. a dynamic form of the small firm 
variant of FS) . The challenge is to find out whether these 
organisational principles are reproducible elsewhere and 
adaptable to local conditions. 
The specific organisational features (corrmon to the small firm 
variant) which Sengenberger and Pyke (1991) identify are: 
* The existence of strong networks of largely small firms, 
which throu$h their linkages of specialisation and 
subcontracting, induce collective efficiency through capturing 
external economies of scope and scale. 
* These networks belong to the same industrial sector and 
encompass all the processes and services along the production 
chain of a family of products (eg ceramic go ds or knitted 
clothing) 
*Industrial districts are geographically bounded - the 
proximity encouraging s~ergistic effects deriving from social 
cohesion and collaboration (1991:2) 
* Another important characteristic of these industrial 
district seems to be inter-finn cooperation and CO!f!I?etition, 
and the existence of institutions and ideologies which sustain 
this (1991:13). 
* The pervasiveness of an entrepreneurial dynamism is another 
conspicuous attribute (1991:13). This appears to flourish 
under favourable conditions which include: 
ease of formation of new firms (eg. access to 
capital, premises, etc; absence of overly 
restrictive legal formalities and "red tape") 
protection from domination and dependency on large 
firms which allows the development of independent 
design capabilities and ease of access to final 
markets. 
sharing of managerial tasks between workers and the 
entrepreneur creates the opportunity to learn how to 
run a business whilst "on the job". In the Third 
Italy, small business people are regarded as 
socially adjacent to craftworkers, and senior 
employees in small and large businesses often set up 
their own establishments. 
social norms which regard the ambition to establish 
one's own business as "normal" and culturally 
acceptable. 
exit costs: statistical evidence from Italy 
indicates a sizeable volume of movement between the 
status of dependent employee and entrepreneur. Also 
bankruptcy tends to result in the reintegration of 
workers and employees into other firms in the 
districts without social stigma 











of dimensions, not just price (1991:3) 
* Flexibility emerging from the recombination of specialised 
production units is also significant. Pyke and Sengenbe~er 
see this flexibility as asslllning either an active form (i.e 
"the ability to exploit market niches and quickly respond to 
orders, based on a skilled and polyvalent labour force") or a 
passive form (i.e. "to submit to outside pressures from 
customers, and to accept cutbacks, and to pass on the 
flexibility requirements of the market to the workforce in a 
coercive manner; through expanding and retrenching productive 
. volume, forcing wage concessions, making "flexible" use of 
short-time and casual employment" (1991: 11)) The passive form 
of flexibility is associated with, what Pyke and Sengenbe~er 
term "low road restructuring". In this instance, cost-cutting 
is seen as boosting profitability, productivity and job 
creation. 
Also institutions and regulation of competition are seen as 
strictures to be minimised. However, "the improvement it 
yields for competitive performance, if there is one, is 
frequently short-lived. Mostly as it turns out, it accents the 
malaise" (1991:9). Instead they advocate a "high road" version 
arising from constructive competition "based on efficiency 
enhancement and innovation; that is through economic sains 
which make wage gains and improvements in social conditions 
possible" (1991:10). They also favour labour standards to curb 
wage coITII?etition. 
* The existence of trust and cooperation where business and 
social communities are integrated so that economic behaviour 
and standards are influenced by community norms and 
expectations, and reflected in business practice. Trust in 
business relations attenuates the fear of taking risks. It 
allows entrepreneurs to invest heavily on the understanding 
that other community members will buy the product of the . 
investment rather than take their custom elsewhere. It also 
facilitates the dissemination of product-related information 
and design ideas. 
* The availabilitr of a trained, adaptable workforce is 
absolutely essential to the organisation of successful 
industrial districts. The widespread expertise might be 
transmitted from parent to child or colleague to collea$Ue 
such that it forms part of a long-standing cultural heritage 
of the region as in the Third Italy, or expertise may be 
provided by technical schools and craft colleges or even 
larger firms. The authors view the devisins of mechanisms that 
"remove the ase-old fear of unemployment without imposing 
total sclerosis on the system" as one of the greatest 
challenges and suggest that "at the heart of a new 
organisation might be a social security system which 
effectively deals with a variety of non-standard working 
patterns, encourages change by not penalising workers for 
(flexible) job loss, recognises that "work takes place in the 
home as well as the factory " (1991: 20) 
* Strong interest groups: Small firms need to have a political 
voice of their own to represent their specific interests and 
these, together with self-hel~ organisations and effective 











industrial organisations (1991:21). 
Sengenberger and Pyke believe that the organisational 
principles described above could be adapted to other local 
economies, through encouraging political and social consensus 
and collaboration in an atmosphere of trust. Therefore regions 
should seriously consider "promoting endogenous development 
from local resources and under basically local control" 
(Sengenberger & Pyke,1991:22). 
It is exactly this note of optimism in the future 
dynamism of locally embedded small-scale manufacture which has 
elicited many critical challenges. In the following section, 
some of the principle areas of critique are briefly examined. 
CRITICISMS OF THE SMALL FIRM VARIANT 
The FS suggestion that the small finn variant could constitute 
a feasible development path, has meet with extensive 
scepticism. Controversy has centred around: 
Technological preconditions: Several critics aver that Piore 
and Sabel's confidence in the potential of computer technology 
to revolutionise the economies of batch production and spur on 
design innovation is misplaced.. Their allusion to process 
flexibility without physical adjustment of equipment but 
through "simply reprogramming" is over optimistic, bearing in 
mind that software is the major cost component of automated 
manufacture: 
"Canputer hardware is indeed powerful, plentiful and apparently 
cheap. But in practice canputer systems are expensive to install 
and maintain, canplex, fragile, insecure and vulnerable to 
disruption, human error and chicanery. They add cost as often as 
value. In many cases canputers .in manufacturing may have done 
more harm than good 11 
(caulkin, 1989: 85) 
In addition, small firms may not have the financial 
wherewithal or the expertise available to exploit computer 
technology fully (Williams et al, 1987: 429-430, Pollert, 
1988: 161). This is especially true in LDCs. 
Institutional preconditions: ~,,s Amin (1989:32) points out, 
traditions such as "the family-based and petty bourgeois 











and consensus, and nrunicipal mercantilist institutions and 
structures are historically sedimented" in certain areas. 
These cultural, religious or political ties may be region 
specific and thus virtually impossible to transfer elsewhere. 
Unless alternative institutions could be evolved which perform 
similar functions, FS as a normative concept is lacking in 
substance. 
Backward versions: The vast majority of the sceptics doubt 
that the dynamic innovative small firm network offering high 
wages and stimulating a high degree of skills formation would 
necessarily be a prominent feature of FS. They contend that 
backward versions (involving labour intensification, long 
hours, low pay, poor work conditions and an increased reliance 
on dependent subcontractors and home works) would tend to 
predominate10 • In an article entitled "Flexible specialisation 
and small firms in Italy: myths and realities", Amin (1989: 
23) adduces evidence in support of this: according to large 
scale survey data for 1983 collated by the Italian National 
Institute of Statistics, the h urly wage rates of manual 
workers were 50% lower in small firms than in large firms. 
Also, in 1983, manual workers in smaller firms (especially 
under 50 employees) worked an average of 12% more hours than 
those in large firms, with this gap widening by 4% in 1985. 
In contrast to Piore and Sabel's interpretation of the 
social relations of production in regional economies as a 
relatively harmonious return to artisanal and craft 
production, Murray asserts that: 
"Racial, gender and skill divisions are essential to the 
operation of this econanic model. The quality craft-work that 
Sabel discovers is work for middle-aged Ernilian men. Semi-skilled 
assembly work, plastic moulding and wiring work is carried out by 
wanen, while heavy foundry and forging work is done by southern 
Italian and North African workers." 
(Murray, 1987: 88) 
He therefore argues that for the vast majority of workers a 
shift towards what he sees as a fragmented, informal and 
casual cottage industry portends a return to "the worst 











excesses of industrial capitalism" (op. cit.). 
Dual labour market: Pollert (1987: 68) considers the FS 
analysis to be based on dual labour market underpinnings as a 
model of dynamic equilibrium: between the "core" of skilled 
workers providing functional (labour process) flexibility, and 
a "periphery" supplying numeric (labour market) flexibility. 
The question then arises as to whether this dualistic nature 
is endemic or merely transitory. Piore and Sabel do concede 
that initially the Italian small business sector was analogous 
to "sweatshops", but maintain that dependent subcontractors 
used their collective capacities to realise process and 
product innovations which allowed them increasingly 
independent access to markets. 
Policy: Research on the small-scale industry in Greece 
(Lyberaki, 1991), has confirmed the presence of features which 
do conform to the FS paradigm: extensive subcontracting and 
dense transactional relations among small independent firms; 
general purpose machinery; clustering of small firms into 
industrial districts. Yet two crucial ingredients are missing: 
specialisation and innovation. The resultant cut-throat 
competition discouraged cooperation, investment in computer 
technology, places downward pressure on wages and ha.s a 
negative impact on product quality. Thus devoting scarce 
resources to encourage the propagation of the small business 
variant of FS could very well serve merely to replicate the 
unpleasant features of the Emilian model. 
Ideological objections also abound. Criticisms directed at the 
small firm variant of FS have also tended to come from 
neomarxist analysts who dispute the implication that 
restructuring at a global level11 has definite ramifications 
for. local economies, necessitating at local level the 
implementation of strategies to promote a form of highly 
11 
These changes to the international econcrny over the past two decades are described by Hirst 
& Zeitlin (1991:1) as "rapid and radical changes in production technology and industrial organisation, a 
ma.jor restructuring of world markets, and consequent large-scale changes at the international, national 











socially regulated local micro-capitalism. For exarrple, 
Rainnie cautions that: 
" ... they [small firms] will not enter the frame as primary status 
suppliers. Instead where they survive at all, they will oc~ 
uncertain and unpredictable positions further down the supplier 
chain. 11 . . 
(Rainn.ie,1993:69) 
This perspective is.not unlike that of Petty Commodity 
Production theory (Le Brun & Gerry,1975), which emphasises the 
relations of subordination and domination between small and 
large fi:rms. Linkages are viewed as channels for exploitation 
and appropriation. Large fi:rms use their unequal economic 
power to coerce smaller business into selling at 
disadvantageous prices and te:rms, passing the risk of product 
market fluctuations onto smaller subcontractors and lowering 
labour costs, since subcontracting allows them to avoid social 
security expenditure and acceding to worker demahds for job 
security. Politically, the alliance betw en big business and 
the state in pursuit of congruent goals results in small f i:rms 
facing increased barriers to markets, eg strict licensing 
procedures or excessively stringent quality standards etc. 
This relationship exists not only between large and smaller 
fi:rms, but among smaller fi:rms themselves: 
"Divisions and distinctions between the petty producer and his 
workers, or other petty ~reducers which he may e:x:J?loit, are 
blurred not only by vertical clientele relationships and 
sanetimes by ethnic (affinity) relationships but also by the 
absence of difference .in life style, living conditions, clothing, 
behaviour, etc. The successful petty producer often works with 
his labourers under the same condition and shares their 
lifestyle. Even where conditions of extreme exploitation prevail, 
the petty producer will not be viewed as a villain as long as the 
socio-cultural consensus is maintained." 
(Lewin, 1985: 126) 
To sum up: while there seems to be a general consensus in 
the literature that the clustering of small fi:rms and inter-
firm division of labour are the most distinctive features of 
the small variant model of FS, many ambiguities still need to 
be resolved. Some points of controversy are: the quality of 
the linkages between fi:rms, especially the tension between 
subcontracting as opportunities for cooperation and learning 
and subcontracting as subordinationi the dynamic between 
sweated labour and innovation and the extent to which this is 











versions of FS. Also, as Smyth (1989) points out: 
concentrating on collective productive activity and 
entrepreneurship and collective efficiency diverts attention 
from the reality that benefits from collaboration accrue to 
individual fi:rms. Fi:rms which secure for themselves a dominant 
position within a cluster may derive-the most benefits, and 
this would have distributional consequences. 
Since most of the literature and errpirical work cited 
above deal primarily with developed country experiences, a 
very pertinent question arises: What relevance (if any at all) 
does the small firm variant of FS have for LDCs? 
FS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Despite the optimism of its advocates, the atterrpted 
introduction of FS to Third World countries is bound to 
encounter formidable technological and skills obstacles. The 
requisite institutional mechanisms for cooperation and 
corrpetition are likely to prove even more intractable. Much 
more analytical and errpirical work has to be done on the FS 
paradigm to determine the extent to which the European 
flexibly specialised industrial districts have historically 
evolved spontaneously from regionally embedded socio-cultural 
institutions, or resulted from purposive action on behalf of 
public and private structures eg local governments etc. If the 
latter weighs more heavily, then clearly there could be 
greater scope for replicating these successes in LDC settings. 
If, however, the influence of social institutions is stronger 
than the state in LDCs, then it becomes a question of whether 
the existing institutions promote or retard the emergence of 
FS. In the arch case of the small firm model in Africa (i.e. 
Kumasi, Ghana), pub~ic intervention played virtually no role 
(Schmitz,1989). The current state of the literature is 
undecided11 , and this has been identified as an area for future 
research. 
The key issue is whether agglomeration economies can be 
11 












generate through institutional intervention. Pyke and 
Sengenberger (1990:5) suggest that 'the question of 
replicability takes on a different light if the focus is put 
not so much on the specific character of these socio-economic 
institutions, but on the functions they perfonn." The 
implication is that while the social institutions in places 
like the Third Italy may not be able to be reproduced exactly 
elsewhere, local institutions in LDCs may be induced to 
perfonn similar functions. The European experience suggests 
that public and private institutions do play a crucial support 
role; after a critical mass of industrial activity is 
established. Stressing that a climate of social consensus and 
credibility of local government are absolute prerequisites for 
the success of local industrial policies, Brusco and Righi 
(1989) describe the role of institutional involvement in the 
Third Italy: provision of Industrial parks as planned external 
economies; the creation of 'real' (as opposed to financial) 
service centres directed towards supplying technological and 
market information to industrial districts specialising in 
certain sectors; as well as loan guarantee consortia which 
also negotiate lower interest rates on behalf of their 
members. The Confederazione Nazionale dell' Artigiano, a 
national confederation of Italian artisans with 340 000 member 
finns, does not only lobby the government on their behalf but 
also provides collective services where economies of scale are 
important (eg export marketing, accounting services, etc). In 
addition, the corrmunist-governed municipalities tended to be 
pursue consensus and alliances with small business people 
(Best, 1990: 209). In the Third Italy, the distinct social and 
political identity of artisans and widespread membership in 
representative local associations, affords them a platfonn to 
articulate their needs and force unions and political 
authorities to deal directly with their interests. 12 
Contrast this environment to that found in most LDCs 
where small businesses are ·frequently confronted with 











seriously distorted, even hostile, legal and regulatory 
environments. Administrative and institutional settings are 
comnonly discriminatory and often impede rather than support 
small business development. Government macro-policy programs, 
credit policies, investment incentives, trade regulations, 
licensing, etc have essentially been biased toward large 
firms, and discriminated against innovation and competition by 
small firms13 • This has also been a feature of the South 
African institutional environment14 • 
Another aspect is the sheer amount of red tape demanded 
by Third World bureaucracies for compliance with municipal by-
laws, health and environmental regulations etc. Those 
necessary to gain access to eg credit and export incentives 
often exceed the capabilities of small firms. The 
centralisation of administration, resources and decision-
making in LDCs like Brazil, often impose severe staff, 
resource and decision-making constraints on regional and local 
government. In addition, most regional and local authorities 
would not reap the benefits of economic growth, since taxation 
generated in the area are generally transferred to the central 
administration. In addition, small entrepreneurs have , by and 
large, not been integrated into established interest groups. 
(Spath, 1992) . While by no means exhaustive, the few factors 
enumerated above do serve to highlight the fortuitous 
environment that favoured the emergence of FS in developed 
countries. Conversely, they also give some indication of the 
obstacles small firms in LDCs face. 
While the obstacles to FS are considerable, the problems 
of mass production in LDCs may be even more pronounced. Small 
internal markets and highly skewed income distributions meant 
that mass production was not underpinned by mass consumption. 
Inflexible imported technologies subjected large local 
producers to the vicissitudes of the export market, transport 
and customs delays and forex shortages (Murray, 1992) . While 
13 
Anderson,1982; Page & Steel,1984; Eades,1985 and Spath,1992 
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acknowledging the manifold problems with FS and the need for 
further theoretical and empirical research, many of the 
champions of the FS thesis continue to affirm its relevance 
for small-scale industry in LDCs. Schmitz (1990) contends 
that, even more than in developed countries, the ability of 
LDCs to adjust to disruptive circumstances is decisive. Since 
FS, almost by definition, should be characterised by 
flexibility, this productive organisational system may be less 
vulnerable than mass production to the periodic crises 
experienced by most LDCs (Schmitz,1989). 
In the 70s and 80s when LDC economies were facing the 
double dilemma of escalating debt servicing obligations and 
dilninished export revenues, small and medium sized firms often 
displayed performances superior to their larger counterparts 
eg in Greece, Peru, Ecuador and the celebrated case of Kumasi 
(Ghana) which, despite negative growth rates in the rest of 
Ghana, displayed a resilient growth and incipient collective 
efficiency. 
While existing small-scale industry in LDCs may have 
proven more flexible than larger ones in their response to new 
internal and even external markets as well as coping with 
interruptions in the supply of inputs, they are often trapped 
in low-innovation low-profit growth paths, Leaving it to 
market forces is not likely to ameliorate the situation. 
Therefore, Rasmussen et al (1992) argue that new forms of 
industrial organisation are required and while they do not 
advocate the uncritical transfer of models such as the small 
firm variant of FS, they suggest that these models may.provide 
valuable clues about such organisational patterns. 
While small f inns in European industrial districts often 
employ advanced technologies, the emergence of collective 
efficiency is not absolutely conditional on the use of hi-
tech, and is therefore equally relevant for nascent LDC 
industrialisation. The main point, which Schmitz (1989) tries 
to communicate, is not that technology necessarily be locally 
produced, rather that the local availability of equipment, 











to small finns is essential for small enterprise development. 
such access and choice tends to arise only with the :sectoral 
agglomeration of clusters of finns where "vertical and 
horizontal links between clustering f inns induce the diffusion 
of knowledge and skills, reduce technological discontinuities 
-and increase the capability to respond to changes in the 
market" (Schmitz, 1992: 66). 
Schmitz (1990) also extends the original formulation of 
FS by expanding upon the role of surplus labour, which is 
completely disregarded in the work of Piore and Sabel. He 
concludes that the sheer size of the labour surplus in LDCs 
tends to detract from innovation, resulting in the inclination 
of small finns to exploit labour to achieve flexibility. While 
maintaining that the dynamic in labour surplus LDCs tends to 
low wage-low technology-low quality, he advises caution in 
interpreting the empirical data. This data shows evidence of 
both large labour surpluses coupled with retarded innovation 
and gross exploitation of especially female flexible 
outworkers (eg the hanmock industry in North East Brazil) , and 
also instances of labour surpluses and innovation (eg the 
knitting and clothing industry in Petropolis and Juiz de Fora, 
Brazil) . 
The effect of surplus labour influences wages and working 
conditions directly, through wages being bid down in intense 
corrpetition. It also operates indirectly. Since wage 
employment offers little opportunity for social and economic 
advancement, the ambition of skilled workers is often to set 
up their own businesses. This often entails entering an ever 
growing and highly competitive subcontracting market. Their 
capital may be sufficient for equipment acquisition, but 
rarely extends to financing the purchase of raw materials. 
They of ten end up as disguised wage l~ur in precarious 
subcontracting relationships with the more established firms. 
This is exacerbated by the fact that, unlike in developed 
countries, social security and unemployment benefits are 
virtually nonexistent in LDCs and therefore cannot function as 











Having completed a review of the theoretical aspects of the FS 
paradigm, a synopsis of empirical work done specifically on 
the furniture sector will be presented. 
CASE STUDIES OF THE FURNITURE SECTOR 
Quite a number of case studies have been conducted in various 
countries through the lens of the FS paradigm. These include 
both developed countries like Italy, Germany and Denmark, and 
in recent years lDCs as well15 • In this section the focus is on 
the research done in the furniture sector, from the FS 
perspective. 
1] THE FURNITURE DISTRICTS OF SALLING, WEST JUTLAND, DENMARK 
One orthodox conceptualisation of industrialisation sees it as 
a process of moving from agriculturally based economic 
activities to the more traditional industries (eg furniture, 
clothing and footwear), ultimately culminating in knowledge 
and technology intensive forms of manufacturing. From this 
viewpoint, it is surprising that traditional industries have 
not completely migrated from the high wage industrial 
countries to the Third World with its cheaper labour. 
Contrary to this intuition, traditional industries have 
flourished in countries like Italy and Denmark in the postwar 
period. This vitality is clearly evident in Kristensen's 
description of the Danish furniture industry: 
Furniture alone has been a particularly strong growth industry. 
Measured by volume of production, the furniture industry 
increased by more thah any other in Denmark during the first half 
of the 1980s. While the index of employment for total 
manufacturing grew frc:rn 100 to 101.3 between 1980 and 1985, that 
of the wood and furniture industry grew to 116.1 during the same 
period. 
(Kristensen,1992:144) 
While the industry is not confined to any single Danish 
county, there are particularly strong clusters in Viborg, 
Rinkobing and Ribe counties. The gradual development of these 
15 For example Ghana (Schrnitz,1990; Damson,1992), Zimbabwe 
(Rasrm.issen,1992), Mexico (Wilson,1992), Pakistan (Nadvi,1992), Tanzania 
(Aeroe,1992), Sudan (Hansohrn,1992), Burkina Faso (Van Dyke,1992), Indonesia 











cluster:s of small finns can be traced back to the 1920s. In 
the area of Salling is a system of small towns which even 
today have small populations of only 1000 and 1500 
inhabitants. Yet each has a cluster of 7 to 11 furniture 
makers or woodworkers together with small engineering finns. 
Kristensen notes that family and master-apprentice 
relations have played an irrportant role as development 
mechanisms (1992:144). Furthermore he discusses several 
organisational traits which might have contributed to the 
district's success: 
1) The industry is dominated by small, locally ow.ned firms: 
55% of employment in the furniture industry nationwide is 
within enterprises with fewer than 50 employees (compared with 
the manufacturing industry average of 55% of employment 
falling within enterprises with fewer than 200 employees. 
2) There is a strong tradition of entrepreneurship and self-
errployment, which can be traced back to feudal times when 
farmers destroyed large landholdings by buying their f anns 
using income earned through an export trade in knitwear, 
cattle and other goods. The survival of the small free farmers 
was achieved through cooperation: first through the comrrrunity 
of villages and later through the establishment of cooperative 
institutions. Apprentices and workers not only acquire the 
skills typically used in small batch production but also the 
management skills in running small f inns and can aspire to 
establish their own establishment. 
3) The district seems to have pursued strategies aimed at high 
quality, design consciousness and the export market. Between 
1973 and 1984, the furniture industry increased exports from 
an index of 100 to an index of 667. This represented a growth 
in exports which was twice that of manufacturing as a whole. 
With 80% of its production exported, it is clear that the 
Danish Furniture industry is highly export orientated 
(Kristensen,1992:146) 
4) Within the industrial district, the individual small firm 
is integrated into a decentral.ised structure of small 











flexibly to new fashion and technical specialisation. 
Collective (external) economies of scale seems to have been 
engendered by the increasing use of specialty equipment, 
supplemented recently by computerisation. 
4) Kristensen contends that these characteristics detailed 
above are greatly enhanced by the preservation of a craft 
tradition and capability: 
Perhaps more than any other factor, it has been the maintenance 
of broadly trained workers, capable of redirecting their skills 
into new avenues dictated by the market, and with the 
entre~reneurial desire to do so, at a time when flexible 
organisation and flexible capabilities are of paramount 
importance, that explains the success of Danish industrial 
districts. 
(Kristensen,1992:148) 
The level of craft-skills in the furniture industry is very 
high: 60% of male employment are skilled workers. The 
proportion of white collar employees is low and the share of 
those with an academic education is half that of white collar 
workers in the rest of the industry. Technicians with a 
background as apprentices are predominant (Kristensen, 
1992:148). In fact this apprenticeship mechanism seems to be 
one of the key driving forces behind the genesis of industrial 
districts in West Jutland: 
... it is in respect of education and educational institutions 
that political activity is involved in reproducin~ the "district" 
on an advanced scale. So today, with so many funu.ture firms 
already established, the reproduction on an extended scale of the 
district character of Salling is beyond doubt. The incremental 
nature of the way new firms are established both adds new 
canplexity and makes it easier for newcaners to find ~cialised 
niches, thereby creating an expanding system in which individuals 
can take all the gradual steps necessary for education as 
entrepreneurs within the furniture industry. 
(Kristensen,1992:148) 
6) The district has a well developed local service 
infrastructure. Many furniture manufacturers in Salling have 
traditionally first used their skills as carpenters and 
cabinetmakers to start-up in the building and construction 
trade, often obtaining finance from small local savings banks. 
During times of recession, many businesses turn to using their 
tools and premises for furniture production. The existence of 
other furniture manufacturers within these corrmunities provide 
not only models for imitation, but also potential customers in 











7) Close family ties together with craft relations play an 
irrportant roles since these small firms are typically family-
owned and managed: 
Durup is illustrative as a case of the furniture industry .. Tile 
nine furniture enterprises of Durup were not created overn:Lght or 
over the last decade. Tileirs is a story of fathers, brothers and 
sons, masters and apprentices, and involves the development of a 
senealogical,tree where craft and family relations have become 
interwoven into 70 years of business history, in which 
enterprises were developed to ccrnpensate for seasonal and 
economic cycles ..... 
(Kristensen,1992:149) 
8) Both competitive and cooperative philosophies and practices 
exist side by side. While most furniture manufacturers have a 
speciality which they sell to the final market, they also 
carry out subcontracting work for other firms in the area. 
This often accounts for the main proportion of turnover. 
Nevertheless, the general sentiment is typically against 
subcontracting alone for fear of becoming too dependent. 
While much of the cooperation takes place on an informal 
basis, few manufacturers believe it is possible to cooperate 
by formal agreement" ... as stories of how such agreements 
have been broken and others' customers enticed away are part 
of the often-repeated myths of the area. Deliberate copying of 
"competitors" products is another" (Kristensen,1992,150). 
All firms try to maximise their exposure to the final 
market as much as possible, competing among each other for 
orders. However, once the order has been placed, the winning 
firm often has to use as subcontractors some of the firms 
which had competed against it, in order to be able to deliver 
the promised goods on time. Other forms of cooperation also 
include many small furniture producers participating as parts 
of groups in trade fairs and a wide spread tradition of 
longer-term agreements between firms whereby each agrees to 
adhere to a certain speciality. 
9) People' s craft identity is important for linking 
individuals and firms to the larger national labour market, 
the craft educational system and other enterprises throughout 
the country. For instance, the experience of craftworkers (as 
apprentices and journeymen or at the technical schools) 













and increased contacts. 
10) The engineering and metalworking industry plays an 
essential role in the proper functioning of small f irrn 
clusters in these districts. Kristensen (1992:154) reports 
that entrepreneurs often attribute their satisfaction with 
their locality to easy access to small machine and-engineering 
shops in which they can have new machinery constructed at 
short notice. The development of new machines and machine 
repair services are facilitated since prototypes can be 
produced quickly by one of the many specialised producers. 
This of course encou.rages branching out into new product 
lines. 
11) Another prominent feature is industrial relations and wage 
setting procedures. These districts have experienced fewer 
strikes and lower rates of absenteeism than the rest of the 
country: 
On the one hand, one has high trust relations, high autoncmy in 
the performance of jobs, and an ease of cc:mnunication between 
employer and etl1?loyees who are knitted together in close 
overlapping family and neighbourly relationships. On the other, 
one has sanewhat narrow procedures of labour recruitment through 
personal ties, tightly drawn restrictions on behaviour and very 
strict discipline. for better or for worse, such a system of 
industrial relations is ideal for flexible specialisation 
{Kristensen,1992:156) 
Kristensen does acknowledge that such a system could easily 
become very exploitative. However, in the Danish case, this J..s 
counterbalanced by a high rate of trade union organisation -
just under 80% of all workers. This high rate of unionisation 
in West Jutland coupled with large and small firms not 
receiving differential treatment by the law, mitigates against 
the adoption of production techniques based on cheap labour. 
Since about 1985, the wage system has changed from one 
based on individual pay at piece work rates to a system of 
hourly wages with group bonuses, permitting wages to exceed 
the national limit16 while promoting trust among workers and 
errployers. 
CU.rrently these industrial districts received little 
16 In 1985 the Danish government launched an incanes policy to hold wage 
increases down to a 2% limit. They received a pranise frcm national employers 
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2] THE EMERGENT FtJRNITURE DISTRICT OF VALLES ORIENTAL, 
CATALONIA, SPAIN 
The institutional context that surrounds the development of 
the small finn industrial districts in Spain differs sharply 
from that of Denmark. Yet the movement from the authoritarian 
Franco regime to.a more democratic politically decentralised 
system is more analogous to the South African context. For 
South Africa which is undergoing a broadly similar ...... 
transfonnation, there is an opportunity to learn from the 
Spanish experience. 
While certain unions and business associations were 
active during the authoritarian period, they were legally 
established only in the late 1970s (Benton,1992:48). Thus 
these organisations' support base among many constituencies is 
still very weak. Both union and errployer groups have very weak 
representation among small f inns and are in highly f ragrnented 
sectors. In addition both sets of organisations channelled 
their energies into consolidating national bargaining 
positions, sometimes at the expense of sectoral and local 
interests. These factors have resulted in the small business 
sector having very little influence on the industrial 
restructuring which took place in the midst of a global 
economic downturn.and internal political transfonnation: 
. . . rapid restructuring in many sectors proceeded virtually in an 
institutional void, with finns scrambling to reduce costs by 
evading taxes and regulations, and workers being left to 
negotiate the tenns and conditions of employment against the 
background but without the active enforcement of official 
contracts. In national triJ?artite bargaining, the political 
environment of the transition also did not favour policy SUJ?ports 
for flexible J?roduction or for the strengthening of industrial 
districts. While employer associations charrpioned the cause of 
dismantling the costly provisions of a rigid labour code, the 
unions were.cau~ht in a defensive position, ironically rallying 
to J?rotect privileges established under the paternalistic labour 
policies of the authoritarian regime. Where national level 
bargaining focused on a particular industry, it was mostly on 
negotiating the time and extent of cut-backs in subsidies to 
heavy industry. 
(Benton, 1992: 52) 
This organisational weakness of the organs of civil society 
matched by a similar lack of cohesion of goverrIDlent policy 
which has moved only slowly away from the support of large 
industry. Autonomous regional goverrIDlents, having come into 












and increased contacts. 
10) The engineering and metalworking industry plays an 
essential role in the proper functioning of small f inn 
clusters in these districts. Kristensen (1992:154) reports 
that entrepreneurs often attribute their satisfaction with 
their locality to easy access to small machine and-engineering 
shops in which they can have new machinery constructed at 
short notice. The development of new machines and machine 
repair services are facilitated since prototypes can be 
produced quickly by one of the many specialised producers. 
This of course encourages branching out into new product 
lines. 
11) Another prominent feature is industrial relations and wage 
setting procedures. These districts have experienced fewer 
strikes and lower rates of absenteeism than the rest of the 
country: 
On the one hand, one has high trust relations, high autoncrny in 
the performance of jobs, and an ease of carmunication between 
employer and em.!?loyees who are knitted together in close 
overlapping family and neighbourly relationships. On the other, 
one has somewhat narrow procedures of labour recruitment through 
personal ties, tightly drawn restrictions on behaviour and very 
strict discipline. for better or for worse, such a system of 
industrial relations is ideal for flexible specialisation 
(Kristensen,1992:156) 
Kristensen does acknowledge that such a system could easily 
become very exploitative. However, in the Danish case, this is 
counterbalanced by a high rate of trade union organisation -
just under 80% of all workers. This high rate of unionisation 
in West Jutland coupled with large and small firms not 
receiving differential treatment by the law, mitigates against 
the adoption of production techniques based on cheap labour. 
Since about 1985, the wage system has changed from one 
based on individual pay at piece work rates to a system of 
hourly wages with group bonuses, permitting wages to exceed 
the national limit16 while promoting trust among workers and 
employers. 
currently these industrial districts received little 
16 In 1985 the Danish government launched an incomes policy to hold wage 
increases down to a 2% limit. They received a premise frcrn national employers 












direct support from the national political level, apart from 
the apprenticeship and technical schools. During the late 
1970s, the Social Democratic government did initiate projects 
to assist SMEs. Technological centres were created in every 
county. Kristensen relates in detail how small entrepreneurs 
and unions were able to shape central institutions (like 
technical schools) to a locally oriented system (through the 
introduction of specific courses etc) . Rules were changed so 
that entrepreneurs could claim unemployment insurance. Other 
regulations which discriminated against privately owned firms 
vis-a-vis limited companies, have been removed. Recently, 
policy towards SMEs has been contradictory: while tax rules 
have reverted to favouring limited CQITlf)anies (to promote hi-
tech R&D programs and international marketing), the government 
has also introduced the "network program" as an attempt to 
learn from the Italian experience and promote cooperation. 
Denmark does not, however, have any organisations 
representing small firms at local level and thus there are no 
organisations acting as a link between a locality's enterprise 
communal and regional politics and the national administration 
and political bodies. This vacuum results in a situation where 
no one body is working for the creation of policy conducive to 
these flexibly specialised industrial districts. Also there is 
no forum for small businesspeople to develop a knowledge of 
their strategic i terests and "combine size, trade and space 
into a unified concept" (Kristensen,1992:162). 
The above descriptiou clearly conveys that while Denmark 
has a unique culture and distinct history, the organisational 
principles operational in its dynamic furniture districts is 
extraordinarily similar to those which characterise the 
Italian model. Kristensen recommends the development of 
interest associations that cater specifically for the small 
firrns to promote self-conscious development of the district. 











presents a challenge to those who think that development funds 
should only be directed towards "modern" industries, and that the 
prcmotion of "traditional" industries is a waste of time and 
money. It is clear that traditional industries and good pay are 
not l.Ilcompatible ... the prcmotion of endogenous resources and 
small firm local networks organised as industrial districts 
offers an alternative. 
{Kristensen,1992:171) 
Other studies of furniture districts in various countries have 
also revealed both similarities to and marked differences from 
the Italian model. In the following section we review some of 











2] TiiE EMERGENT FtJRNITURE DISTRICT OF VALLES ORIENTAL, 
CATALONIA, SP.Am 
The institutional context that surrounds the development of 
the small firm industrial districts in Spain differs sharply 
from that of Denmark. Yet the movement from the authoritarian 
Franco regime to a more democratic politically decentralised 
system is more analogous to the South African context. For 
South Africa which is undergoing a broadly similar 
transformation, there is an opportunity to learn from the 
Spanish experience. 
While certain unions and business associations were 
active during the authoritarian period, they were legally 
established only in the late 1970s (Benton,1992:48). Thus 
these organisations' support base among many constituencies is 
still very weak. Both union and errployer groups have very weak 
representation among small firms and are in highly fragmented 
sectors. In addition both sets of organisations channelled 
their energies into consolidating national bargaining 
positions, sometimes at the expense of sectoral and local 
interests. These factors have resulted in the small business 
sector having very little influence on the industrial 
restructuring which took place in the midst of a global 
economic downturn.and internal political transformation: 
... rapid restructuring in many sectors proceeded virtually in an 
institutional void, with firms scrambling to reduce costs by 
evading taxes a d regulations, and workers being left to 
negotiate the terms and conditions of employment against the 
background but without the active enforcement of official 
contracts. In national tri~artite bargaining, the political 
environment of the transition also did not favour policy su~ports 
for flexible ~roduction or for the strengthening of industrial 
districts. While employer associations charrpioned the cause of 
dismantling the costly provisions of a rigid labour code, the 
unions were causht in a defensive position, ironically rallying 
to ~rotect privileges established under the paternalistic labour 
policies of the authoritarian regime. Where national level 
bargaining focused on a particular industry, it was mostly on 
negotiating the time and extent of cut-backs in subsidies to 
heavy industry. 
(Benton, 1992: 52) 
This organisational weakness of the organs of civil society is 
matched by a similar lack of cohesion of government policy 
which has moved only slowly away from the support of large 
industry. Autonomous regional governments, having come into 











inexperienced players. Municipal governments, virtually absent 
as potent political forces during the Franco regime, are also 
quite weak financially (Benton,1992:52). 
In recent years, however, certain political trends have 
been more favourable to flexible productive systems, despite 
these institutional barriers. These include the reappearance 
of regional governments in the 1980s: 
Political decentralisation opens the opportunity for new sets of 
alliances to shape the regulatory context for geographically 
concentrated industry. SUpporting this trend is the gradual 
weakening of the tripartite bargaining system that lent stability 
to the transition period. The conciliatory posture of corporate-
group leadership and their focus on a narrow range of issues have 
opened the door for the reaPJ?f:arance of strong grass-roots 
organisations with more specific objectives. such a trend would 
help to shift the focus of bargaining away fran the provisions of 
the labour code and towards more substantial issues of concern in 
emerging industrial districts such as opportunities for worker 
mobility, technological upgrading and infrastructural 
improvements 
{Benton, 1992: 55) 
In general the irrpact of productive decentralisation on 
industry has mainly been to reduce the cost of and downgrade 
the conditions of labour. However there are certain pockets of 
agglomerated activity which approximate, to differing degrees, 
the industrial districts of the Third Italy. They not only 
survived, but displayed some degree of dynamism, despite, and 
not because of, institutional conditions. 
The region of Valles Oriental has recently experienced a 
proliferation of small finns17 • This was accorrpanied by 
relative strengthening of industrial specialisation in 
plastics and wood products, especially furniture. While 
errployment declined in the rest of Spain, the number of 
industrial jobs actually increased by 28.85% between 1970 and 
1981. Also in corrparison with peripheral areas of Madrid, the 
networks of subcontracting and relationships of cooperation 
among f inns are highly developed, even if they are not as 
dense or resilient as those found in the Third Italy. 
Very small producers dominate the wood furniture sector 
in Valles Oriental: the average firm errploys only 8 workers. 
17 In fact the vast majority of firms in Valles Oriental are SMEs: 
95.9% have fewer than 100 workers and account for 55.2% of employment, while 













The most interesting case is that of the wood furniture industry 
... Within the zone, firms are grouped ac~ording.to produ~t 
specialisat~on, ~ith a ful~ range of special~y firms serV"l.Ilg.each 
product mini-region. Classical forms of vertical subcontracting 
are carrnon, with firms that specialise ii: design and assemb~y 
subcontracting various phases of production to smaller specialty 
workshops. But horizontal subcontracting is also cannon, since 
firms need to diversify products wi~hin a parti~ar style: . 
significantly, ~roducers have orgaru.sed a carmercial association 
to market the district's products, both wholesale and through a 
large retail outlet, run and managed as a joint venture. 
(Benton,1992:67) 
Empirical evidence suggest that employers take cognisance of 
inter-firm relations and the "industrial atmosphere 11 when 
selecting firm locations - among the most cited motivations 
reported by factory owners for choosing their current 
locations were the desire to live and work in the same zone, 
the benefits of being close to suppliers and clients, and the 
concentration of industry in the same zone (Benton,1992:68). 
The successful districts also reflect a strong local tradition 
of industrial development and entrepreneurship. 
From the description above, it is evident that the 
furniture district of Valles Oriental does, to a certain 
extent, exhibit the characteristics which typify the small 
firm variant of FS. 
3] SECTORAL RESTRUCTORING IN CYPRUS 
The most salient featu e of this particular case study is that 
the Cypriot government has explicitly adopted FS as its 
approach to industrial restructuring. The scope of this paper 
precludes an indepth examination of the Cyprus Industrial 
Strategy. This discursion will consequently be narrowly 
confined to aspects directly pertaining to the furniture 
sector. 
Murray (1992:266) describes in detail one of the FS 
inspired initiatives, involving 13 furniture manufacturers and 
the Cyprus Development Bank: 
They agreed to open a joint retail shop, for which they would 
produce newly-desi$Tled products on a specialised basis. one firm 
was charged with kitchen furniture, another with bedroom suites, 
a third with children's furniture, a fourth concentrated on 
upholstery and so on, bearing in mind the styles being produced 
by the others. The members of the consortium (known as the A-Z 
consortium) were allowed to keep their own retail shops and their 
lines of production, but the specialised furniture could only be 












As a result of this arrangement, economies in both production 
and marketing were realised. The longer runs have reduced unit 
costs of the specialised furniture by 20-25% and permitted 
investment in more machinery as well as the acquisition of 
larger premises. Retailing economies include the consortium's 
ability to employ a specialist inter~or designer at the point 
of sale, an expanded variety in product range (economies of 
scale) and the employment of 2 marketing staff to engage in 
research and propose new product developments. Other major 
benefits were a joint delivery system and an augmented 
collective capacity for advertising exposure. 
This form of collective entrepreneurship also had 
extremely positive impact on productive efficiency. The joint 
retailing necessitated careful costing. A costing subcommittee 
was established, and mandated to visit each manufacturer, 
examine his or her cost structure and advise on improving 
costing methods and materials where costs were out of line. 
This of course promoted the adoption of more effective 
methods. They were in addition able to fund specialist 
consultants from Italy and by means of joint purchasing, cut 
materials costs by 25% (Murray, 1992:266). This initiative 
seems highly successful: 
The consortium now has shops in each of the major towns in 
<;YJ?rus. Its consortium sales exceeded those projected in the 
initial feasibility study. In 1989 they won a major export order 
to the Soviet Union and have become successful exporters to Saudi 
Arabia. From a group of small manufacturers canpeting for the 
domestic market, they have become - if all their employment is 
added together - the second largest manufacturing concern in 
Cyprus, with a growing export record. 
(Murray,1992:266) 
Furniture makers also organised visits to Emilia-Romagna and 
the Milan region to attempt to learn from experiences of the 
Italian consortia and real service centres. These have been 
adopted as a model for Cyprus, as a centre to be partly funded 
by the industrialists themselves - to provide marketing and 
technical assistance as well as access to Computer Aided 
Design (CAD) equipment. 
By engaging furniture manufacturers and suppliers of 
inputs in a constructive dialogue the quality of locally 











between the final manufacturers and the suppliers, each 
blaming the other for inferior quality and poor production 
teclmiques. 
All of the above examples illustrate the actions which 
flowed from the sectoral strategies adopted by the Cypriots. 
While it is unlikely that any particular policy prescriptions 
derived from the three case studies detailed above are 
directly applicable to the South African furniture industry, 
the experiences in Denmark, Spain and Cyprus do demonstrate 
the use of FS as a frame of reference in analysing the 
dynamics peculiar to each furniture cluster locale. 
Having given some idea of the underlying theory and the 
empirical work done, on the furniture sector, the focal point 
of the next chapter will be FS in relation t  South African 
policy making. This will be followed by an overview of the 
furniture industry .in South Africa and those features peculiar 
to the Western Cape, which provides the background rnaterial 
for the empirical study of furniture clusters in the 












FS AND THE SOUTH. AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY DEBATE 
The rapidly proliferating FS literature has, in the past few 
years, begun to permeate the thinking of academics and policy 
makers. With growing frequency, it is finding expression 
(~ither explicitly or implicitly) in the policy proposals for 
stimulating small-scale industJ::Y. 
It is incontrovertible that there are many factors which would 
inhibit Italian-style industrial districts manifesting 
themselves in South Africa. Some of the more obvious would 
include a severe shortage of management expertise, a legacy of 
a racist, highly confrontational industrial relations system, 
high illiteracy rates and a racially skewed distribution of 
craft skills, the weakly developed capacity of small and 
medium-sized manufacturers to subcontract, a business culture 
distinctly antithetic to free information flow and 
collaboration. The list is far from exhaustive. 
While acknowledging these barriers, Rogerson nevertheless 
maintains: 
... local industry is increasingly camtitted to the adaption of 
new technology and new organisational innovations in production 
... Moreover, the political transformation taking place in South 
Africa J?Oints to potential new opportunities for advancing a 
small-firm variant of flexible production. In terms of 
development planning for a democratic econcrny, guest ions of · 
flexible specialization are increasingly surfacing on the policy 
agenda. Of special concern is the prospect for extended flexible 
production to the making of new (and irrproved) kinds of social 
relations in the workplace. 
(RoSJerson,1994:13) 
Rogerson (1993:48) suggests furthermore that post-apartheid 
initiatives for the promotion of small-scale manufacturing in 
a regional/local development context could be enriched by 
seriously considering the organisational principles 
underpinning industrial districts. 
The need to encourage effective inter-firm cooperation 
and the emergence of industrial districts is also noted by 
Joffe et al (1993:21). This imperative is seen to be firmly 
within the realm of public policy. Government, both at 
national and regional level, is envisioned as playing a 
pivotal role in inducing conditions that would be conducive 











If small scale ente?:prises are to develop, then the state ~t . 
create an environment which encourages.and nurtures 1:11em: In.this 
context the ANC argues for the establishment of an institution 
to suppbrt small-scale manufacturing units. Un.like the Small 
Business Development Corporation (SBDC), the envisaged . 
institution would not be a state institution per se but will 
coordinate the efforts of other state institutions and small 
manufactures. In addition to S!anting loans an<;l proyidiz:ig . 
trainin~, such an inst~tute.will pranote ~gencies li~e inter-finn 
productive agencies, financial and marketiz:ig consortia ~o ensure 
that the small firms have access to econam..es-of-scale in the 
provision of marketing and technological infonnation. This sort 
of networking will enable small manufacturers to shape and 
influence the market collectively, as well as canpete effectively 
with vertically integrated firms. 
· (Joffe & Ngoasheng,1992:486) 
Any practicable approach to the formation of industrial 
districts would have to take the following points into 
account. First, as Kaplan indicates, while pronounced patterns 
of geographically clustered small firms do exist, "this has 
seldom resulted in small and medium enterprises sharing 
scaling costs such as design and marketing" (1993:26). Second, 
the FS paradigm stresses the local embeddedness of the 
production process (the failure of the previous regimes 
decentralisation policy serves to underscore this) . 
An FS inspired policy framework would have to seek out 
already existing regionally and sectorally concentrated 
agglomerations which displa  incipient features of, or 
potential for FS .. These positive features would be reinforced 
by the training, infrastuctural and inter-firm linkage 
policies detailed above. To borrow a chemistry metaphor, once 
a "critical" mass of locally clustered forms in the same or 
closely related sectors accumulates, policy would aim at 
catalysing the "chain reaction" of interfirm cooperation which 
characterise the small firm variant. 
FS has unmistakeably been one of the theoretical inputs 
into the policy orientation set out in the recent White Paper 
on the national strategy for the promotion of small business: 
Successful examples of strategies based on collective efficiency exist 
world-wide, for example in the Emilia-Ranagna in Italy, Baden-
Wurttemberg in Germany and some regions in Denmark. Through 
these interventions local $Overnrnents have created 
conditions whereby small firms can - throu$h co-operation 
networks, the provision of supportive services and infra-
structure improvements - compete with the best of large 
international firms 


















Bloch recorrmends a broadly similar approach for the 
furniture industry in particular: 
... given its nature as an intensely localised industry within a 
metropolitanised national spatial context, the furniture industry 
lends itself extremely well to a local-level analysis which 
can also potentially frame broader strategic directions for the 
overall industry . . . in this kind of frame, the possibilities of 
upgrading such a highly localised industrial agglomeration · 
through the building of network-facilitating institutions such as 
those characterising say, the Italian furniture districts proper 
-- marketing and financing consortia, local authority land 
programs (Best,1989) -- can be properly explored. 
(Bloch,1993,73) 
Mashigo and Manning (1993:45) suggest, in addition, that the 
·high value furniture market in the Western Cape " ... may have 
greater growth potential, possibly in the mode of the small 
designer furniture enterprises for which the 'Third Italy' is 
distinguished". This is based on their findings that 
competition in this market is heavily grounded in quality and 
design 11 with some of the products sold at a higher price than 
large competitors• prices" (loc. cit.). Also these 
entrepreneurs had generally accumulated experience through 
employment in the furniture industry prior to starting their 
own businesses. 
Bloch (1993) also mentions Maitland-Epping Industria as 
an example of a furniture district in the cape, noting the 
presence of input suppliers and warehousing facilities. It 
would be extremely useful to compare the nature of interaction 
between these "spontaneously" agglomerated furniture firms 
vis-a-vis the "artificial11 small furniture manufacturing 
cluster at the Blackheath industrial hive. 
While the secondary sources cited above do indicate the 
existence of furniture districts in the Western Cape, they 
tend to employ different definitions of the terms "district" 
or "cluster". Often these definitions were (as in much of the 
FS literature) vague and shed very little light on the 
physical delimitations of these clusters. This and other 
issues come under more detailed consideration in the section 
which deals with the methodology underlying the case study. 
The next chapter sketches cursorily the most prominent 












AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOUI'H AFRICAN WOODEN FURNITURE INDUSTRY 
The objective of this section is to outline briefly the 
contours of the furniture industry in South Africa as a whole, 
with regard to its structure and recent perfonnance18 • 
Furthermore those characteristics more specific to the Western 
cape will be reviewed in greater detail in order to gain some 
insight into the environment which shapes local furniture 
production. Particular errphasis will be placed on the role of 
SMEs. 
Market conditions and performance 
The wood furniture industry (SIC 332) constitutes roughly 1% 
of total manufacturing, with an estimated current output of 
around R2-3 billion per year (Bloch,1993). Table 2 details 
household expenditure in 1993 by area and item, revealing that 
the demand for furniture is centred in the metropolitan areas. 
Table 2: Household expenditure on furniture, 1993 
!TYPE l=P. I NATIONAL I TBVC STATES 1~ IIDrAL 
Bedroom suites 367 949 188 441 78 546 236 285 871 221 
Diningroom 171 839 62 963 37 393 85 878 358 073 
Lounge suite 378 822 99 453 55 699 184 490 727 464 
Kitchen 118 045 73 563 36 954 78 126 306 688 
Garden furn. 57 174 733 294 8 566 66 767 
Loose items - 314 499 56 104 41 127 124 846 536 576 
wardrobes etc 
'IDTAL 1417 325 481 257 250 013 718 191 2866 
786 
source: , 1994: 110 
Errployment in the last 5 years has ranged from 30 000 to 35 
000, approximately 2.5~ of the labour force (Bloch,1993). 
Nationally there are about 1350 plants (Manning,1993) and 
18 Since the furniture industry has not been the subject of extensive 
research, this section draws heavily on the work of Bloch (1993) and Manning 













their production may be broadly categorised into distinct 
segments. The wooden segment includes both solid wood 
furniture and case goods (made from chipboard and other 
composite boards) . It comprises about 40% of total furniture 
production. Bedding (mattresses and bases) and upholstery 
(covered wooden furniture) each account for about 25% of 
production, with the remaining 10% consisting of office 
furniture (Bloch,1993). 
Figure 2: Fu:oriture Sales, 1974 - 1992 
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Furniture sales tend to be highly seasonal. This seasonal 
volatility is compounded also by sensitivity to cyclical 
variations. Since 1987, as can be seen in figure 2, furniture 
sales have followed a declining trend and have only stabilised 
and improved marginally in the last 18 months. Predictably, 
poor sales have impacted negatively on production - in fact 
the furniture industry _is only now showing signs of emerging 
from one of the worst crises experienced by the industry. 
Production volumes plummeted by 17% in 1991 and declined by a 
further 10% in 1992. 124 firms closed down between January 











Figure 3: capacity Utilisation in the Fw:niture Industry 
Cepaclty Utlllsatlon In the Fumltue Industry 
- SFURNlITI Year 
Besides these factory closures and accompanying 
retrenchments, the sharp reduction in furniture manufacturing 
output precipitated widespread short-time working throughout 
the industry. However, the decline in the number of employees 
in the industry slowed to 2% in the 12 months to December 1993 
from the 11% reduction in the same period in 1992 (AFCOL 
annual report,1994). 
As can be seen in table 3, the primary source of demand 
















Table 3: Shares of the furxli ture market by population group 






source: , 1.::194:: !:Jl 
needs of black consumers are increasingly being seen as an 
opportunity for growth in what would otherwise be a quite 
mature market. The furniture business is very closely linked 
to the vicissitudes of the building sector, and the much 
promised surge of RDP induced low income housing construction 
is seen to be a cause of optimism for the industry. 
Market Structures 
The most striking feature of the furniture industry is the 
high degree of concentration in the retail market, the 
domination of production by a few large groups and collusion 
by suppliers in input markets, many of whom are vertically 
integrated with the manufacturers (Manning,1993). 
The bulk of all furniture is sold via the retail groups. 
·In 1986, it was estimated that 12 groups held about 92.3% of 
the market share in the industry. Independent retailers make 
up only about 20% of the over 3000 retailers in South Africa. 
The findings of Manning's (1993) survey of small and medium 
furniture producers indicates that this is a serious barrier 
inhibiting the development of small and black businesses. 
First, the volume of production required by the large 
retailers (who seek to maintain product consistency in their 
outlets nationwide) is often beyond the capacity of SrvIEs. 
Second, the retailers set payment, pricing and standards which 
affect the profitability of smaller manufacturing concerns. 
Manning (1993:6) contends that, given that most large 
retailers provide extensive credit to their customers, they 












since there are so few independent retailers, manufacturers 
tend to have limited choice as to working with the retailer 
chains (Marming,1993). 
Finally the role of social networks which underpin the 
economic success of the dynamic Italian districts19 , seems to 
operate somewhat perversely,in South Africa. Here they tend to 
reinforce an exclusionary business culture, often inimical to 
small, black business: 
Buyers of the retail groups have acquired a reputation for 
inflexibility in their buying :i;>atterns, a phencmenon which well 
serves the interests of established manufacturers, but which 
amounts to a further barriers restricting the access of smaller 
or black firms. Since buyers, with few exceptions are white men, 
black manufacturers who are excluded fran the informal networks 
pervading the economy and society, find it even more difficult to 
procure orders fran them. 
(Manning, 1993: 7)' 
Concentration is also evident in production. AFCOL2° which 
claims to be "the most extensive furniture manufacturing 
operation in the Southern Hemisphere in terms of turnover, 
profits and assets" (AFCOL,1994:4), produces almost 40%" of all 
household furniture (Manning,1993). The office furniture 
market is dominated by another large group - Mathieson and 
Ashley - with about a 40%" market share. 
It is not clear, however, how this market structure 
impacts on the efficiency of the furniture industry as a 
whole. There is no a priori reason why the degree of 
competition between relatively few large groups closely linked 
with their supplier networks, should be any less intense than 
for a greater number of firms. In fact, as Manning (1993:9) 
points out, this organisational configuration may well be a 
significant determinant of the efficiency of many successful 
Japanese firms. On the other hand, where there is little 
evidence of predatory pricing by the large groups, this 
particular ownership structure may impact extremely negatively 
on small-scale furniture manufacturers: 
... the extensive linkages between the manufacturing groups and 
the retail groups suggests that independent manufacturers out of 
19 By providing, as Brusco (1981) describes it, social cohesion for 
productive decentralisation. 











the stable of these groups stand less of a chance of winning 
contracts. The links between the manufacturers and their 
suppliers also raises the questions about the fainiess of the 
treatment accorded to inde~dent firms. It is thus likely that 
this ownership structure will undermine the canpetition ~rocess 
by placing small and independent manufacturers and suppliers of 
inputs in an extremely vulnerable position. 
. (Manning, 1993: 10) 
In addition, the input markets (eg pine, boards) show evidence 
of widespread collusion (Bloch,1993; Manning,1993). This, in 
conjunction with the factors discussed previously, serves to 
create an environment in which smaller f inns find it extremely 
difficult to corrpete. Yet it is extremely difficult to isolate 
errpirically the cyclical demand influences on small f inn 
perfonnance from the influence of such structural factors. 
Bloch vividly describes the predicament of hundreds of small 
sin~le plant, often family owned and run firms, which are most 
subJect to "the ma;r;:rin-squeezing power of the mass retailers" 
(Best,1990:229). This power is coupled on the other end with the 
control exerted over i!l!?ut costs by dcminant suppliers: pine 
supply, in particular, is virtually cartelised (Irrmelman,1993). 
These smaller carpanies with inadequate capitalisation, generally 
low design capabilities, low levels of networking and 
specialisation, low and attrited skills bases and a lack of 
institutional support, produce TTnJ.ch the same product and TTnJ.St 
then canpete on price alone, often attempting to cut their costs. 
(Bloch,1993:69) 
Under market conditions which place severe downward pressure 
on even the large groups' margins, the high degree of 
bankruptcies, shutdown and layoffs in the small-scale 
manufacturing sector is hardly surprising. 
Export perf o:rmance 
Furniture exports have grown substantially in the past few 
years. Since the initial base for furniture was exceedingly 
low, the export value of the furniture industry is however 
still quite small. In 1992, furniture to the value of 
approximately Rl70 million was exported from South Africa, 
representing roughly 10% of output (Manning,1993). Yet the 
growth of exports has been quite promising. Between 1972 and 
1983, the average growth of furniture exports in 1990 prices 
was 18.8%. From 1983 to 1990 it increased to 22.9% (World 
Bank,1994a,372). One reason for this may be that the recession 
forced local producers into the export market. 
In a recent policy document, the World Bank suggests that 
















strategic option for South Africa compatible with its wage 
structure. One of the light industries referred to is 
furniture: 
A sustainable expansion of light manufacturing is nonetheless 
possible with the prevailing wage structure. It can take place in 
export markets for niche products - high quality textiles, 
garments, shoes and funriture .... The essential ingredient for 
successful niche exJ?Ort markets include high product quality, 
reliability in meetl.I1g delivery schedules and a quick turnaround. 
(World Bank,1994b,13) 
However, the majority of South Africa's current furniture 
exports is relatively low value knock-down pine furniture 
(Manning,1993) and not, in general, the higher value added 
products described above. Moving up the value chain would 
entail a substantial re-orientation on the part of local 
manufacturers. 
Tariffs on imports are presently at about 20%, and less 
than one percent of furniture sold is imported. Export 
incentives available to exporters (GEIS) is at 19% and seems 
to play a major role in prompting manufacturers to venture 
into export markets (Manning,1993). However, this situation 
could change rapidly once South Africa modifies its tariff 
structures to become more GATT consistent. This could be a 
major issue in the furniture industry in the near future. The 
findings of Manning's (1993) research suggest that the 
institutional support offered by SAFTO is inadequate and she 
recorrrnends that it be restructured to serve a wider 
constituency. On the positive side, full containerisation, 
competitive freighting costs and the depreciating rand seems 
to have had a favourable effect. 
The Westeni cape Market 
Spatial agglomeration in three well defined regions is another 
salient characteristic of the furniture industry. Table 4 













(Kaplan,1993:15). The comparative technological stagnation 
vis-a-vis competitors like the Danish furniture industry is a 
cause for concern: 
The fu:miture industry training board (FITB) has voiced the 
concern that they are required to teach people the "older 
technology" while knowing that the "new technology" is what would 
be required in the future. The cost of high tech machinery is 
often prohibitive, and it was often mentioned that the small size 
of the local market prohibited the use of very productive 
equipnent such as in use in Italy. 
(Wesgro, 1992: 10) 
The last observation is especially pertinent - it highlights 
the important contribution of supporting industries in the 
really dynamic furniture districts worldwide. The Italian 
furniture districts have very close links with machinery 
manufacturers, and a similar close working relatio ship 
characterises the Salling district in Denmark. Another 
attribute of these districts are suppliers who constantly 
strive to improve the quality of inputs, which again to a 
large extent is absent from the South African industry22 • 
Most inputs are available locally23 except for the 
imported woods. So access to inputs per se is not likely to be 
a problem. However, the bulkiness of furniture means that for 
the Western Cape manufacturers, transport costs play a 
critical role in determining competitiveness and the scope for 
geographic market expansion. In addition to cost 
considerations, furniture may not transport well over long 
distances. This issue can be mitigated to some extent by the 
furniture design which accorrmodates transport. However, design 
capacity is one of the most serious deficiencies of the 
industry (WESGR0,1992) 
sector is spent on R&D (Kaplan,1993:15) 
22 A case in point would be canpressed wood, which looks like becoming 
the breakthrough of the 90s in furniture desi~ and production. In 
collaboration with a private canpany, the Danish Institute of Technology has 
~ioneered a process which allows treated wood (eg Beech and Ash) to be bent 
into sharper, more intricate curves with less dan~er of breaking. The 
institute has encoura~ed artist and fu:miture designers to join in in testing 
the creative possibilities of the process and thereby demonstrate ways of 
using canpressed wood to manUfacturers. 













While there is a relatively dense.institutional network 
of employer and trade associations, unions and industrial 
councils in South Africa at a sectoral level, these are often 
lacking in coordination or face institutional capacity 
constraints: 
The weakest link amongst existing sectoral institutions are the 
industry associations. Many exist either as mere post-boxes 
enlivened only by a threat to their protective tariff, or, at 
best, as heavily bureaucratic bodies that deal, in addition to 
lobbyin$ government for protection, representing employers in 
centralised wage negotiations. Conspicuously absent are 
initiatives around supply side issues - technological development 
and training or around the export markets" 
(Lewis,1993:17) 
The furniture industry does not seem to be an outstanding 
exception to the rule in this respect. There is no evidence of 
significant formal collaboration facilitated by employer 
organisations in conjunction with other relevant sectoral 
institutions. Bloch comments on the absence of strategic 
planning for the industry: 
The furniture industry is then not a healthy industry. It is also 
a weakly coordinated one at the level of strategy: the Federation 
of Furniture Manufacturers, and its regional structures (which 
represent 850 canpanies containin~ 90% of the workforce) manage 
labour relations, have set up training schemes in the fonn of a 
Furniture Industry Training Board, and have punted a mark of 
quality to improve this particular (and vital) aspect of 
production. The National Productivity Institute has also assisted 
canpanies, particularly ones in the hcmelands. But there is 
nothing approaching a strategy for the industry. 
(Bloch,1993:70) 
In the Industrial Council (IC) for the furniture manufacturing 
industry of the Western Cape, the two parties are the Cape 
Furniture Manufacturers' Association (CFMA) and the National 
Union of Furniture and Allied Workers of South Africa 
(NUFAWSA). 
A closed shop exists in the Western Cape furniture industry24 • 
The IC Agreement (1993-1994) prohibits piecework25 or 
24 Clause 25, IC Agreement 1993-4: "No employer who is a member of the 
employer's organisation shall continue to employ employees for whom wages are 
prescribed in part II of the Agreement who, while being eligible for 
membership of the trade union, are not members of such trade union within a 
period of 90 days from the date of coming into operation of this agreement or 
of the start of employment ... " 
25 Clause 4: Industrial Council Agreement (1993-1994) "No employer shall 
require or allow any person to work piece-work or any other system by which 











outwork26 • Industrial Council wages are based on activities in 
the production process. For instance, employees engaged in 
upholstery of spring or firm bed bases should earn a minimum 
of R283,80; boring holes and filling cushions R262,90; 
applying wax and fixing handles by screws, bolts and nuts 
through pre-bored holes R242,00 etc27 • This form of wage 
structure is often perceived as detrimental by the smaller 
manufacturers who have to pay artisan wages to single phase 
operators who they have trained to be competent iri only one 
activity. 
However, a firm employing a maximum of 4 employees 
(including a working employer) may elect not to be party to 
the IC agreement, in which case the wage structure detailed 
above would not be binding. On one hand, it is argued that 
this sort of exemption may allow microenterprises28 to 
establish themselves. But once the IC threshold is reached, 
smaller employers have to not only conform with the official 
wage structure, but also conform with the benefit structure eg 
holiday and bonus funq levies, sick and maternity benefits and 
other IC levies etc. This means that microenterprises may 
initially follow a strategy of minimising labour costs rather 
than upgrading quality, and clearly this strategy is not 
viable as the firm begins to grow (beyond the IC threshold) . 
Previous surveys have indicated that: 
Sane of the smaller employers have cc:rnplained that the Industrial 
Council structure and arrangements discriminate against them. 
condition that no employee be paid less than he would be entitled to in terms 
of the IC agreement. 
26 Clause 4: Industrial Council Agreement "No employer shall require or 
allow any of his employees to undertake work in connection with the Furniture 
Manufacturing Industry elsewhere than in his establishment except when such 
work is in cc:rnpletion of an order placed with an employer and consists of 
fitting, assembling repairing or polishins furniture in premises owned or 
occupied by the person for whan the work is undertaken" (Gove:rnment 
Gazette,1994) 
27 The 1993-4 I agreement enumerates about 156 different activities and 
their corresponding wages. 
28 Like the term "small" business, there is unfortunately no uniform 
definition of this term in the literature. In the context of this case study, 
the term "microenterprise" will be rather arbitrarily applied to firms with 











High levels of wages relative to what they can do, and resistance 
to attempts to reorganise the bu~iness to greater employee . 
participation and pay on the basis of results rather than.time 
were mentioned. Another exarrple of problems was that working 
through the holidays was apparently not allowed. 
(WESGR0,1992:12) 
But, as pointed out by a NUFAWSA representative, the IC wage 
structure represents a minimum, and most errployers pay in 
excess of those rates (Dumpies,1994). This conflict of 
interest between smaller manufacturers and organised labour is 
by no means confined to the furniture industry. This is an 
area requiring urgent policy attention, especially in the 
light of the new government's stated corrmitment to irrprove 
labour conditions, as well as promote further job creation and 
stimulating SMEs. This issue will be explored in greater depth 
later29 • 
The other prominent institution is the furniture industry 
training board (FITB). Training is provided by the FITB in the 
different trades30 for apprentices as well as supervisory 
diplomas and other management training courses. The FITB is 
financed by a levy on the manufacturers amounting to 2% of 
their weekly wage bill. These levies are corrpulsory and paid 
via the Industrial Council, and there is generally no further 
fee for services rendered except when the FITB draws on 
outside industrial relations or technological expertise. When 
introducing the present training system, Smith (executive 
director of FedFurn) comments on the previous systerr1 in the 
FITB Artisan Training brochure: 
As manufacturers we have for years carplained about the state of 
our Industry's artisan training - and with some justification. 
lm.y industry employing around 3.5 ooo, that indentures less than 
120 apprentices per year and has 83% of these fail their trade 
test, has reasons to worry about its skills future ... we have 
enoush carpet.it.ion from our suppliers and the retailers, not to 
mention our consumer durables for a I?rofitable share of the 
consumer rand. Let us not have negative carpet.it.ion within our 
own ranks for the skills necessary to keep our businesses 
29 These concerns have already been raised in the White Paper on small 
business development (Dept of Trade and Industry,1995) 
30 These trade courses include wood-machining, cabinet making, frame 
making, upholstery, carving and wood polishing. Courses are modular with 5 
stases (qualified stage 1 operator basic/single; Qualified stage 2 operator, 
basic/multiple; stage 3 operator carplex/single, qualified stage 4 operator, 












(FITB, undated, 1) 
This is then a prime example of the "public good" problem so 
often confronting sectoral agglomerations - the generation of 
goods and services required by the collectivity, but which the 
individual business unit has little incentive to supply 
(Best,1990:237). 
Since most micro and small enterprises elect to remain 
outside the IC system, they consequently are not required to 
pay the training levies; nor do they receive much 
institutional support from the FITB. CUrrently small employers 
play virtually no role within the training board system. 
Generally requests for training by manufacturers elicit 
appropriate responses from the board. Because Sf'l!Es do not take 
part in the board, the FITB as an institution is not oriented 
toward the specific Sf'l!Es, even though individual trainers may 
be more sensitive to these requirements. While the local FITB 
has corrrnitted more resources to training than any other region 
(there is a staff of 11), this is not sufficient to address 
the skills backlog, especially if it were to expand its client 
base. 
Noble (1994) suggests hat exempting smaller firms from 
the levy (under the current system) could have negative 
consequences for their long-run development. Once the IC 
threshold is reached, many smaller firms then have to contend 
with the training levy in addition to other IC requirements. 
It is often precisely this sector which could benefit most 
from management and artisan training. But while SMEs do not 
necessarily receive skills training directly, they may still 
benefit indirectly. The new artisans trained by the FITB may 
be enticed into the small business sector by offers of higher 
monetary wages, but without benefits like pension and sick 
fund privileges (Durrpies,1994). 
31 Smith's mention of "negative canpetition" was reinforced in a 
personal interview with one of the FITB trainers who described the culture of 
the industry as "paranoid" with each manufacturer scared of sanebody else 
poaching his/her skilled personnel. The culture was also described as one of 
fierce canpetition, highly "secretive" not conducive to the sharing of 











Another crucial area is that of design. The FI'IB does 
present a design module to artisans as part of the artisan 
training program, this is not adequate. There are al.so no 
courses exclusively devoted to furniture design. This is in 
part due to financial constraints (the FI'IB does not-have 
funds available to send the trainers overseas to become 
acquainted with training methods and state-of-the-art 
technology) as well as a lack of capacity to train the 
trainers themselves (eg computer techniques etc) . 
While design may be absolutely essential for penetrating 
the high valued market niches recorrmended by the World Bank, 
design capacity in the Western Cape is extremely lim.ited32 • In 
addition furniture designers are often imported fron1 overseas, 
thus there is a gap in learning and knowledge acquisition by 
the furniture industry in this area. 
CONCLUDJNG REMARKS 
This section atternpted to focus attention on the most salient 
features of the furniture industry, with special emphasis on 
those characteristics peculiar to the Western Cape. Drawing 
extensively on previous ernpirical studies, it atterrpted also 
to describe the institutional environment which furrliture 
manufacturers (and small-scale producers in particular) 
operate, as well as the major market trends. This provides a 
background to the ernpirical study detailed in the following 
section. 
32 Noble (1994) guesstimates that of the 250 firms in the Western cape, 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
AN EMPIRICAL .STODY OF THE Ft1RNITORE SECTOR m THE WESTERN CAPE 
The FS paradigm emphasizes that industrial policy research 
should take a disaggregated approach, differentiated along 
·sectoral lines. It stresses that groups of firms and the 
extent to which they interact should be the object of study, 
rather than individual firms in isolation. From the FS 
perspective, the importance of interpersonal relationships, 
the local embeddedness of the production process and the 
important role assigned to local technological capability have 
very specific implications for empirical research. As Benton 
(1992) suggests, any effort to promote growth in incipient 
industrial districts must analyse local cooperative 
relationships and attempt to devise policy interventions that 
respond specifically to their logic. Unlike most small 
business research, FS encourages a longitudinal view of small 
firm development, looking at the history of firms and the 
staged development of linkages. FS does not make a distinction 
between the size of firms per se, placing more emphasis on 
their relations with other firms. 
The above characteristics of FS have important 
methodological implications for any empirical study using this 
·"" approach. There are several other interconnected social, 
political, spatial and economic factors which could also be 
relevant to the networking dynamic in a particular locality. 
However, it is hardly likely that any one study would be able 
to address all these issues. At this point it is perhaps 
useful to review briefly how other researchers have worked 
within the FS paradigm. 
As mentioned before, the task of deriving a working 
definition of the small firm variant of FS or some framework 
for empirical research is impeded by a lack of conceptual 
clarity. A criticism often levelled at the proponents of the 
FS ideal type is that it provides a shopping list of the 
positive qualities of dynamic industrial districts, without 
specifying the causal mechanisms so vital in the coherence of 











The way in which Hirst and Zeitlin present their ideal-tyPical 
mod.el helps to insulate ~eir analys~s fran any substc;mtial 
criticism. Thus they claim thati as.ideal t~s, flex:il?l~ 
specialisation and mass production involve neither empirical. 
generalisations nor descriptive hypotheses. Nor do they ~cify 
real causal mechanisms operating beneath a welter of empirical 
events: serving only a.heuristic pm:pose, th~y l;iave.no truth 
value (Hirst and zeitlin, 1991, p6 and 3). This if!Pll.es. that ~uch 
ideal types are intended.t9 serve only as yardsticks.with w~ch 
to c~ different empiri~al cases in terms o~ tJ:ieir relative 
deviation from a non-normative norm. Whether this is a useful 
exercise is hard to judge and is not one to. which Hirst and. 
Zeitlin restrict themselves in actual practice. For they gtll.ckly 
proceed to offer stylised arguments and empirical generalisations 
about the circumstances in which FS emerges. 
(Jessop,1992:35) 
Jessop's reference to a "non-normative norm" is very 
significant. There is a tendency for the supporters of the FS 
paradigm to champion its use as a normative, rather than a 
positive approach33 , without explicitly justifying it in terms 
of its possible merits and demerits. Using FS as a positive 
approach can yield significant methodological benefits, as 
Aeroe (1992) points out. But advocating FS as a norrretive 
concept should entail a far firmer conceptual grounding and 
more stringent and compelling justifications - requirements 
often entirely ignored in the debate surrounding FS. Asheim 
(1992) in a similar vein criticises the lack of specification 
of relationships between the composite elements of the FS 
theory: 
... to qualify as an ideal tyPe, flexible specialisation must be 
defined in a narrow and precise way as a "specific model of 
productive organisation". Because of the lack of theoretical 
specifications, the theoretical aJ?proach evaporates into one of 
an ordinary empirical generalisation, which due to its inductive 
procedure cannot attain any theoretical status. 
(Asheim, 1992: 52) 
Without specifying causal relations, the FS paradigrrt may not 
be able to generate any really useful policy guidelines. Take, 
for instance, a small firm cluster which displays all the 
characteristics of the ideal type except two (say innovation 
and multi-skilled labour) . Assume that one deviation from the 
ideal type is tractable to various policy instrument (say 
skilling) and the other (lack of innovation) is not. Then one 
is faced with a classical second best conundrum: will 
33 A positive approach to FS would be used to ascertain whether FS 
exists in a given locality (ie. degree of conformance to the ideal t:rPE:). An 
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eliminating the one imperfection bring the system closer to 
FS, or will it exacerbate the situation (for instance, by 
promoting the creation of dual labour markets) . Without some 
idea of the chain of causalities set in motion by any policy 
action, it is extremely difficult to design effective policy. 
The static nature of the model is thus a serious deficiency. 
This conceptual confusion is compounded by large 
empirical gaps. There is no consensus on.what constitutes an 
industrial district, its significance and whether its success 
is sustainable. As mentioned above, it is not sufficient to 
recognise that clustering improves efficiency, without having 
some understanding of how and why. 
Schmitz (1994:18) acknowledges these conceptual problems: 
"the industrial district model is not an analytical model but 
an ideal type, or less flatteringly, a list of stylised 
facts". In his study of the Sinos Valley shoe producing region 
in Brazil, he proceeds by contrasting the conditions actually 
prevailing with the ideal type. Noting that there is an 
inherent danger that this might give rise to a static 
approach, he attempts to track changes within the cluster over 
time. He comments: 
Overall, it seems that the industrial district model was helpful 
in that it guided us to critical factors which needed to be 
investigated to explain the growth of the shoe industry: the 
canbination of canpetition and cooperation, collective activity, 
social embeddedness etc. Disaggregating the model into its 
cc::mi;>0nents provided a useful framework for orsanising the 
empirical investigation. However, since this· is a case study of a 
rapidly growing industry, two shortcanings of this model are also 
apparent: it emphasises specialisation i.e. differentiation by 
~roduct/process, but ignores (negates?) differentiation by size, 
it is strong on linkages internal to the cluster but is weak on 
external linkages. 
(Schmitz,1994:18) 
A further complication derives from the wide variation 
within sectors themselves: most industries can be compatible 
with many diverse stories of industrial organisation, 
depending on which market segments are under examination, and 
over which time period. 
Schmitz (1992) suggests that the focal point of further 
research should be whether dynamic growth of small f i:rm 
clusters has occurred in LDCs, and which conditions produce, 











overall conclusion, it would be necessary to address a number 
of subquestions. Schmitz (1992) lists a few areas of focus: 
Is the cluster merely a multiplicat~on.of ~roducer~ 
making similar products or has specialisation and inter-
f irm division of labour developed? 
Do these vertical links include a network of suppliers 
(of raw materials, equipment, spare parts and repair 
services) and of purchasers (of intermediate or primary 
products)? 
Are there exarrples of horizontal cooperation and how 
significant are they? 
How have local labour markets influenced competitive 
strategy and market entry? 
How have socio-cultural factors influenced exit costs · 
and inter-firm relations? 
Has there been quantitative growth (increase in output) 
and qualitative growth (improved product quality, 
product variation)? 
Can one distinguish between different phases in the 
growth process? 
How has growth been influenced by national economic 
policies and legislation? 
What has been the role of local institutions (public 
and private)? If they have played a nesative role, what 
is required to turn them into institutions enhancing 
small firm development and effectiveness? · 
Other subsidiary issues would include the nature of the 
cluster: (a) hierarchical - where a large firm coordinates 
subcontracting among a network of small firms or (b) non-
hierarchical - in which equals compete or cooperate. There is 
a need to distinguish the relative importance of external 
economies of scale34 • Furthermore, attention should be paid to 
the nature of collective efficiency: planned (consciously 
pursued) or unplanned (circumstantial) . 
The various raised by Schmitz are very broad in ambit, but 
were as far as possible accommodated in the design of this 
34 External economies include both "real" and "pecuniary" economies. The 
former affect the actual conditions of production while the latter refers to 











study. Schmitz (1992) suggests-that the case study method be 
applied, and implemented in 4 stages: 
1] A questionnaire survey from which the contours of the 
small firm economy can be drawn in quantitative 
measure. Questions would be few, simple and closed. 
2] The second stage would consist of in-depth case studies 
of selected firms using a structured but open-ended 
interview schedule. 
3] The third stage would be to gather additional 
information from suppliers of credit, raw materials 
etc. 
4] A fourth stage would concentrate on institutions, both 
public and private. 
The procedure outlined above provides an excellent guideline 
for the application of the FS methodology. However, in the 
present study it is somewhat modified. The initial phase is 
dispensed with entirely. Unlike many oth r LDCs, the South 
African small business sector and that of the Western Cape in 
particular, has already been the object of extensive research. 
Thus secondary data and the records of institutions like the 
SBDC could be relied on in the exploratory phase of respondent 
selection. 
The second stage conforms to Schmitz's proposed procedure 
and comprises the core of this study. The third stage was also 
omitted - due to time constraints. This is a serious 
shortcoming of this particular case study. The third stage is 
absolutely essential for gaining a more balanced view of the 
interest groups within sectoral development, instead of 
relying on the manufacturers' views, which are, naturally, 
biased. It could also function as a form of information 
validation. The fourth stage draws on secondary data as well 
as own research, but makes up a relatively small section of 
the study. 
Van Dijk (1992) has also applied an FS-inspired methodology 
to the informal and formal sectors in the capital of Burkina 
Faso (a small, landlocked African country) . For the informal 
sector, the key terms of FS were operationalised as follows: 











using simple tools (248 or 72%) and those using machines or 
more sophisticated tools. T-tests were then applied to 
ascertain if any statistical differences between the 2 groups 
existed in respect of investment in tools, total em.ployment, 
weekly turnover, weekly income to the entrepreneur, etc. There 
proved to be significant differences at the 1% level. 
Collective efficiency is seen as the interaction between 
technology, type of goods produced, interfirm division of 
labour, small firm communities and networks. Some indication 
of collective efficiency was obtained by comparing the 
economic results (with respect to the variables listed 
previously) of firms within small firm communities to those 
operating in isolation. 
This is an interesting approach, but was not selected for 
this study. The main reason is that for this type of 
statistical inference one needs a fairly large sample size of 
both the clustered and the control group. In addition, even if 
the sample size were sufficiently large, statistical inference 
is based on the assurrption of random data points. Random 
sampling, as will be explained later in greater detail, could 
defeat the main aim of FS inspired studies which concentrate 
on systematic linkages between the various elements of a 
cluster. 
In the formal sector, Van Dijk attempts to classify firms 
fitting into the FS approach. Firms were classified on the 
basis of the following criteria: 
l] Technology (multipurpose-equipment and skills required); 
2] Innovation (indications of product and process 
innovations) ; 
3] Inter-firm cooperation (subcontracting or other 
arrangements); 
4] Networking (formal eg Chamber of Corrrnerce, and informal) . 
The score was based on at least one point for technology or 
innovation and two points for each of the other 
characteristics. If the score was 3 or more, that firm was 
considered as having the potential to follow or to be 











excluded from this index eg. innovat1ve mentality and 
collective efficiency. Nevertheless, since measurement of some 
of the variables did depend on the judgement of the 
researcher, this inevitably introduces a degree of 
subjectivity. 
It would be reductionist in the extreme to maintain that 
any single measure could capture all the nuances intrinsic to 
the FS approach. However, despite its simplistic nature, an 
index of this type could, with appropriate qualifications, 
serve as an adequate surrmary measure of deviation from the 
ideal type. 
Aeroe (1992) provides an excellent framework for the 
analysis of the local embeddedness of small finn production 
and the interaction between overall social structures, 
agglomeration dynamics and the local socio-cultural 
environment. 
Figure 4: Aeroe's (1992) analytical framework of small fir.m 
production · 
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institutions. It is hoped that this deficiency would be 
overcome by subsequent errpirical work along similar lines. 
In this section the difficulties encountered in moving from an 
ideal-typical paradigm of FS to more applied research have 
been discussed. In order to operationalise the FS paradigm, 
researchers have recast it in more concrete terms, in the fo:rm 
of tractable working definitions. A few of these alternatives 
have been considered. In the following section, the specific 













The primary data source was the 1992/3 Industrial Survey of 
the Western Cape Regional Service Council (WCRSC) . This 
enabled the compilation of a list of furniture manufacturers 
by industrial area, and gave information on their physical 
location. This was supplemented by lists from the SBDC, 
Jeffrey Kleinsmit's Black Book and the cape Furniture 
Manufacturers Association. The areas with the greatest number 
of physically clustered firms were Blackheath (including the 
Industrial hive), Epping, Maitland, Lansdowne and Woodstock-
Salt River, each having 15-25 furniture establishments of 
varying sizes. This preliminary catalogue of furniture 
manufacturers indicated that the two basic prerequisites of FS 
were satisfied (i.e. a critical mass of spatially concentrated 
and sectorally specialised firms) both at the level of the 
industrial area as delineated by the WCRSC (for the 5 areas 
mentioned above) and for the Western Cape as a whole. 
One of the key objectives of the empirical study was to 
investigate the effect of the variable "locality" on other 
variables such as inter-firm cooperation, access to raw 
materials and supplier relations, the interface with customers 
and the overall functioning and performance of the firms. 
Accordingly sampling was done primarily on the basis of 
locality. The only other sampling restriction was market 
segment. Based on the assumption that firms catering to the 
middle and high value markets would be more likely to display 
the attributes characteristic of FS, firms from the lower end 
of the market were excluded from the sample. The sample was 
not stratified by size of firm (i.e. did not explicitly take 
into account firm size) . Stratifying by firm size as well as 
location would entail using a large sample space. However, 
ignoring this factor could lead to a sample which is skewed 
toward large or very small firms. If firm size exercises a 
potent influence on the qualitative nature of interactions 











customers or other institutions, then neglecting to control 
for this factor could be a serious weakness of this study. 
Fortunately, as discussed in the statement of results, the 
size distribution of the sample spanned the range from micro-
and small enterprises to large enterprises. This was partly a 
function of the particular localities sampled. 
It was then necessary for the purposes of this case study 
to define the geographical ambit of a locality i.e. to delimit 
in physical terms the boundaries of each "cluster". While some 
studies have applied the term cluster or locality to entire 
provinces (Rabelloti, for instance, uses the Italian province 
of Marche as a sampling frame) , other studies have 
concentrated on small towns as units of analysis (eg Aeroe 
(1992)). 
One option could be to regard the entire Western cape as a 
single locality, possibly stratifying for size. Given that the 
sample set then becomes quite large (at least 250, probably 
more given that the number of informal enterprises are 
difficult to ascertain), random sampling would perhaps be more 
appropriate. However, once again to be truly representative 
the sample would have to be quite large. 
Beside resource and time constraints which rendered 
impossible a survey of this magnitude, such a survey would 
shed light only on whether cooperation exists, rather than the 
process of cooperation per se or the link between locality and 
cooperation. Random sampling could in fact defeat the object 
of this case study which seeks to investigate the systematic 
relationships between firms within a locality, their 
suppliers, customers, unions, employee organisation and other 
actors in their environment. Therefore sampling was not done 
on a random basis. This type of non-random sampling has been a 












To uncover the variations and dc:rninance structures between the 
enterJ?rises these were not surveyed at a randcm basis, but 
individually selected to cover the whole spectre (sic) of small town 
enterprises. If entrepreneurs were sampled at random, ~ew large and 
dcminating enterprises.may hav~ escaped t~e survey, while a large 
nUmber of small, less influential enterprises could have been 
surveyed. Hence this latter sample gives a wrong picture of th~ 
structure and the linkages, and consequently of the agglaneration 
dynamics. 
(Aeroe, 1992 :64) 
This means that statistical inference is not possible, and 
also has irrplications for the generalisability of any 
conclusions. However, since the locally embedded nature of 
production demands a certain specificity rather than broad 
generalisations, this is not a major drawback. 
A further alternative would be to use the entire Western 
cape as a sarrpling frame but to atterrpt to explore the process 
of cooperation by isolating and examining networks of firms 
already engaged in cooperation, either through references or 
word of mouth. The main problem with this approach is that it 
may yield several duos, trios, quartets or even quintets of 
cooperating firms. The corrponent firms of these networks may 
however be scattered across different locations (and hence be 
affected by different environmental and institutional 
factors) . This makes any corrparison between the various 
networked groups extremely difficult since the dynamic of 
interf inn interaction is likely to be moulded by the different 
environments in which the constituent firms in the network 
operate and in addition to various cultural factors, different 
levels of technology, finn size etc. Also, if the accent falls 
on linkages per se rather than the spatial dimension, then it 
is possible that cooperating firms may be situated outside the 
locality. In this case it would not be possible to investigate 
economies arising from proximity (if any) . 
The method finally chosen was to regard the locality as a 
very corrpact geographical area. Of the possible areas which 
evinced evidence of agglomeration, three were chosen for 
inclusion in the sarrple: Epping (1 and 2 as defined by the 
WCRSC) , Blackheath (the SBDC hive) and Lansdowne (roughly the 
area between Lansdowne, Turf Hall, College and Vanguard 
roads) . The WCRSC industrial area demarcations were very 











span on average only eight roads. Enterprises within these 
areas would be physically very close and operate under the 
same environmental and institutional conditions. This is quite 
important because it recognises that, due to the residual 
effects of the Group Areas Act, the environmental, 
infrastructural and institutional factors acting on an 
enterprise could be vastly disparate in different areas of the 
Western Cape. Since broadly the same environmental forces are 
acting on all firms within a particular location, this 
facilitates interfirm and inter-locational comparisons. 
In additions controlling for location allows one to make 
use of the strong correlation between location of the 
enterprise and the social group of the owner (again a result 
of Group Areas) to ensure that a variety of s cial groups were 
sampled without actually having to stratify for this factor -
Epping having formerly been a "White" area and Lansdowne and 
Black.heath mixed areas. A similar situation holds for firm 
size: the incubator role played by the Black.heath hive 
suggests a preponderance of younger smaller enterprises in 
locale, while larger enterprises are located in Epping and 
Lansdowne. 
Each of the three areas selected contained sufficient firms 
so that, even after allowing for 50% of the firms approached 
to refuse to participate or not to meet the middle or high 
value market criterion, a minimum of 5 firms from each 
locality would fulfil these requirements. While the intention 
was to contact all the firms within these three locales 
telephonically to confirm conformance to sampling 
specifications, the targeted sample size was 20 firms. Ideally 
this should have been larger. Where a respondent indicated 
cooperation with any other firm in the vicinity, every attempt 
was made to include them in the survey - the respondent was 
asked to act as a referee. 
Of the 17 manufacturers in Lansdowne, 3 refused to 
participate, 4 were not suitable for inclusion in the sample 
(their major source of revenue either come from products not 











shop fitting or joinery on windows and doors), 1 finn was 
agreeable and fulfilled the requirements but was not 
interviewed, 1 finn was not contacted and 8 manufacturers 
participated in the case study. 
In Epping there were 12 furniture manufacturing concerns, 
of which 2 refused to participate, 1 was in the process of 
liquidation, 4 firms were not suitable and 5 firms 
participated. 
Of the 27 woodworking concerns in the Blackheath hive, 4 
refused to participate, 5 were not contacted, 3 were 
survivalist or operated only part-time by their owners, 8 were 
unsuitable (either due to the product - wendy houses and 
kennels - not classifiable as furniture, or because of low 
quality or non-wooden materials) and 7 participated. 
Prospective respondents who met the initial screening 
requirements and consented to take part in the case study were 
subsequently interviewed. 
THE QUESTIO:NN"A.IRE 
A sample of the questionnaire is attached in Appendix 2. The 
questionnaire was tested in a pilot study on a group of 3 
furniture manufacturers. In this process, the questionnaire, 
which is based on the most salient aspects of the FS 
methodology, was refined. The researcher also gained some 
experience in administering it. These are not included in the 
reported analysis. 
Aeroe (1992) represents graphically the various potential 












Figure 5: Potential linkages between small fi:c:ns and other 
econanic entities 




FAMILY AND FRIENDS: 





Source: Aeroe, 1992:58 re air 1udltin , marketing 
Questionnaire content and design were aimed at uncovering as 
many of these linkages as possible. In addition, information 
was also elicited on reasons for locating in a particular area 
(perceived advantages and disadvantages), entrepreneurial 
background, and the development and current operation of the 
firm. 
In surrmary, the working definition of the small firm 
variant of FS used in this study includes the following 
elements: 
INTRA-FIRM ATTRIBUTES: 
relatively diversified and changeable product range 
technology(multi-purpose machinery) and innovation 
(product and process) 
adaptable labour force 
INI'ER-FIRM ATTRIBUTES: 
geographic clustering of firms with a comnon product 
range, input needs, and skills required 
cooperation within groups of firms and a variety of 
services accessible to all of them 
social cohesion and bounds on price competition alone 
TI-le term "microenterprise" will be used to refer to 
enterprises with 10 or fewer employees. TI-le term "small 
business" refers to enterprises with 11 to 50 employees. 
"Medium-sized businesses" are those with 51 to 300 employees 
and "large businesses" employ more than 300 employees. As 
always there is an element of arbitrariness in constructing 
working definitions, but these were chosen in relation to the 











(Manning, 1993). Employment was chosen as an indicator of size 
rather than some fonn of asset base, due to data availability 
and consistency considerations. 
THE INTERVIEWS 
The questionnaires were administered verbally, with the 
responses recorded on tape and transcribed later for further 
analysis. Where respondents preferred not to be taped, their 
responses were recorded manually. This constituted the 
structured portion of the interview and was followed by 10 
minutes unstructured conversation. The entire interview lasted 
on average 45 minutes. 
The interviewer took great pains not to exceed this time 
estimate, bearing in mind the opportunity costs involved. In 
very large finns, every effort was be made to interview more 
than one person (even if telephonically). 
In order to gain a clearer idea of the institutional 
environment in which SMEs in the Western cape operate, 
unstructured interviews were conducted (telephonically and in 
person) with representatives of the Furniture Industry 
Training Board, industrial council and trade union. However, 
this was generally to confinn secondary sources, which 
comprise the major data input for this section. 
Having described the research method adopted, the statement of 
results is presented in the next section, with some analysis35 • 
35 Unfortunately the responses to certain questions posed in the 
questionnaire are not included in the statement of results. These 
cases are where the entrepreneur was not able to estimate the 
answers e$. some entrepreneurs who manufactured very varied 
product lines and were vulnerable to seasonality in sales were 
not able to estimate physical units of output per month of a 
particular product, but could give estimates of monetary value 
of sales. Other instances include the questions on entry and 
exit barriers (factors like good will play an important role 
but are not readily quantifiable) . Sometimes the data 
collected was not strictly comparable across f inns (ag wage 
data where job descriptions differ across finns) . Also, not 
all the entre~reneurs where willing to divulge their monthly 
incomes, and in some cases (where finns were private 












RESULTS OF THE SURVEY 
In this section, the results of the empirical survey are 
presented and analysed. First a profile of the surveyed f i:rms 
is built up. This covers areas like marketing, technology etc. 
Then"a profile of entrepreneurs is presented, and finally the 
firm's linkages with industry associations etc. are 
scrutinised. 
FIRM PROFILES 
As can be seen from table 6, 35% of the sample were located in 
Blackheath (B), 40% of the sample were located in Lansdowne 
(L) and 25% of the finns were situated in Epping. The age 
distribution of all the finns in the sample is fairly even. 
Table 6: Age distribution of enterprises by location 
I AGE IN YRSI B I L I E I 'IOTALI 
1-5 20% 5% 0% 25% 
6-10 15% 5% 0% 20% 
11-25 0% 10% 10% 20% 
26-40 0% 10% 5% 15% 
> 40 0% 10% 10% 20% 
'IOTAL 35% 40% 25% 100% 
ource: uw.n ~uxvey, ]_!::J!::J4 (n=:.CU) 
Yet there is considerable variation in age structure between 
industrial areas. Finns in Blackheath were on average much 
younger, all of them less than 10 years old and over half 5 
years old or less. This is a reflection of the fact that all 
firms (except one) from Blackheath were located in the SBDC 
hive, which serves an "incubator" role. The average age of the 
firms in Lansdowne was 26 years. Finns in Epping were even 
more established with firm ages ranging from 17 to 60 years. 
Most of the finns in the sample were private companies. 
However, 57% of the finns in Blackheath were sole 
proprietorships, the remainder being closed corporations. This 











Table 7: Fo:cm of ownership by location 
B L E TOTAL 
SOLE PROPRIETOR 20% 10% 0% 30% 
cc 15% 5% 5% 25% 
PI'Y (L'ID) 0% 25% 20% 45% 
TOTAL 35% 40'% 25% 100% 
.::;ource: ow.n surve , y 1.994 1n=2DJ 
In both Lansdowne and Epping, the vast majority of the firms 
under investigation were private companies. Despite this, 
management control tended to reside either with the individual 
entrepreneur (35% of the total sarrple) or within families (35% 
of the total sarrple) . Family control was defined as a 
situation where at least 2 members of a particular family own 
and manage a business. 
Table 8: Management control of enterprise by location 
I 
B L E TOTAL I 
Individ 20% 10% 5% 35% 
Partner 10% 5% 0% 15% 
Family 5% 20% 10% 35% 
Company 0% ao -0 5% 5% 
Group 0% 5% 5% 10% 
TOTAL 35% 40% 25% 100% 
.::;ource: ow.n b'urvey, .l!;'.514 (n=2U) 
Half of all the firms in Lansdowne were family controlled, 
some of them had been operated by the same family for 3 
generations. In the Lansdowne area, these families were mainly 
Indian and Coloured, but there was one White family business. 
The one firm in Lansdowne which is currently owned by a large 
group, had been family founded and operated. 
Despite being larger and more established, the enterprises in 
Epping were also controlled mainly by families and 
individuals. All of these were white - not surprising given 
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independent corrpany and another was owned by a large group. 
The major product lines of these finns are represented 
below in table 9. The furniture category includes diningroom 
and bedroom suites. Upholstery is mainly lounge suites. The 
third category consists primarily of built-in cupboards and 
kitchen cupboards. The "other" category refers to corrponents . 
(eg cupboard doors), pine beds etc. 
Table 9: Enterprise major product line by location 
·/PRODUCT I Bl LI Ell 'IDTALI 
Furniture 10% 20% 10% 40%" 
Upholstery 5%" 5% 15% 25%" 
BIC/Kitchen 15% 5% 0% 20%" 
Other 5% 10% 0% 15%" 
I 'IDTAL I 35% I 40% I 25% II 100% I 
~ource: surve , y 194 (n=20) 
Respondents were asked to provide reasons for locating in a 
particular area. Most of the finns quoted various hive 
benefits (eg access to machinery, deregulation etc) and the 
fact that premises were available as major reasons for 
locating in Blackheath. A demonstration effect seems also to 
be operative: in one instance the enterprise was located in 
the hive because the owners' neighbour had located there. In 
another case, an entrepreneur had worked in wage errployment in 
the hive, before going into business on his own. One 
respondent describes the proximity of the hive to his home as 
being a positive factor. 29% indicated that they intended to 
move in the near future to bigger premises and one of the 
firms felt that, given they were not dependent on passing 











Table 10: Reasons for location in Blackheath 
!REASON FOR LOC II 
DEM 
I 





NO OF FIRMS 2 3 3 1 2 1 
29% 43% 43% 14% 29% 14% % OF FIRMS 
DEM= demonsuation errects; HlVE - rac111t1c;s in the -fu ve; 
AVAIL = availability of premises, DM = location does not 
matter; 
MOVE = firm intends to move soon; OWN RES = near ow.ner' s home 
Source: Ow.n Survey, 1994 (n=7) 
All the above motivations clearly illustrate the Blackheath 
hive's character as an "artificial" sectoral agglomeration. As 
one would expect, there is little or no sign of local 
embeddedness in this instance. 
The two major reasons for location in Lansdowne seems to be 
first its central position in relation to the markets firms 
are serving and in relation to transport routes, and second 
proximity to the labour force. In addition, nearness to the 
owner's residence was also seems to have played a role in 
choice of location. Two microenterprise owners operating from 
home cited rent-free premises as an advantage. In the 
Lansdowne area, a greater degree of "local embeddedness" (in 
the sense that productive activity merges into the larger life 
of the corrmunity) prevailed, due mainly to the overlap between 
the residential and industrial areas. 
Table 11: Reasons for location in Lansdowne 
IREASoN FOR LOC II c I L I OR I 0 I RF I M I DIS 
NO OF FIRMS 4 4 3 2 2 2 1 
% OF FIRMS 50% 50% 37.5% 25 25% 25% 12.5% 
:; - central si ti on· LI - near labour rorce · po I I 
OR = near ovmer' s residence,· RF = rent. free premises; 
M = intend moving; DIS = location disadvantageous; 
O = other reasons 
Source: Ow.n Survey, 1994 (n=B) 
Two of the enterprises intended to relocate in the future -













of the firms indicated that being situated in Lansdowne was a 
disadvantage - this was basically because they serviced the 
entire domestic market. In general, nobody mentioned anything 
relating to external economies. Only one respondent mentioned 
closeness to suppliers as an attractive feature of the 
Lansdowne area and another one felt that clothing factory 
shops in the vicinity was advantageous in attracting 
customers. 
Table 12: Reasons for location, in Epping 
REASON FOR LOC c L IN DIS 
NO OF FIRMS 3 2 2 2 
% OF TOTAL 60% 40% 40% 40% 
SAMPLE 
L. = centra.L si ti on · L = near .LabOur rorce · po I f 
IN = inertia,- DIS = present location disadvantageous 
Source: Ow.n Survey, 1994 (n=5) 
In Epping, centrality with respect to transport routes and 
markets and proximity to the labour force were cited as major 
reasons for location. Two of the finns felt that locating in 
Epping was a disadvantage since most of their sales are 
upcountry. Sheer inertia seems also to be a factor in choice 
of location - of ten enterprises remain in less than ideal 
locations which the founder of the firm had chosen. 
In short, the entrepreneurs do not perceive external 
economies as being important in selecting a location. It is 
quite surprising that more entrepreneurs did not mention 
proximity to suppliers as a locational advantage, given the 
bulkiness of the wood and other raw materials. In all three 
areas under observation there were at least 2 timber suppliers 
(eg Lansdowne Board, Lumber City, Federated Timbers and PG 
Bison etc) . 
Also one would have expected Group Areas restrictions to 
have been a factor in firm location, especially for the more 
established Indian and Coloured owned firms. However, this was 











As can be seen from table 13 below, 40% of firms in the sarrple 
were rnicroenterprises, 35% were small businesses, 15% were 
medium sized businesses and the remaining 10% were large 
businesses. There is a huge difference in average monthly 
sales of small businesses (approximately Rl20 000 to Rl50 000 
a month) with those of medium-sized businesses (which had 
average monthly turnovers between R 1000 000 and R6 000 000) 
and large enterprises which have turnovers of more than R5 000 
000. 
Table 13: Vol'l.DllS of monthly sales by size of entei:prise 
Number of Errployees I 
SALES IN R 1-10 11-50 51-150 151-300 >300 'TOTAL 
< 20 000 15% 15% 
20-39 000 20% 20% 
40-59 000 5% 5% 10% 
60-'79 000 5% 5% 
80-99 000 5% 5% 
100 - 249 15% 15% 
250 - 999 5% 5% 
lm - Sm 5% 5% 
> Sm 5% 5% 10% 20% 
TOTAL 40% 35% 10% 5% 10% 100% 
source: awn Survey, 1994 n=20J 
Most of the respondents reported a distinct seasonality in 
sales. Nevertheless, there does seem to be an positive 
relationship between finn size and sales volume. What is 
interesting is the wide variation in sales in the small f inn 
category. This seems to depend not only on the size of finn, 
but the niche the finn is situated in. 
Table 14 depicts the geographic areas served by firms in the 
sample. The vast majority of the sampled firms restrict their 
activities to the Western Cape. Sometimes this is dictated by 











installing) or else a conscious decision by the very upmarket 
finns to serve only the local market. The firms which serviced 
the entire local market tended to sell to the large retail 
chains. In general it was these firms that reported 
disadvantages in being located in the Cape. 
Table 14: Geographic markets served by finns 
I REGION I Bl LI El IDI'AL I PERCENT I 
WC 6 5 1 12 60% 
CAPE 1 1 5% 
SA 1 3 3 7 35% 
NAMIBIA 1 2 1 4 20% 
AN GO IA 1 1 2 10% 
OTHER AFR 1 1 2 10% 
UK/US 1 3 4 20% 
~ource: uw.n ~urvey, 1994 D-=:LU) 
A few firms in the sample did export, but this did not, in 
general, constitute a significant proportion of output. 
However, it is quite remarkable that 40% of all the firms did 
export at all - this may be because the sample concentrated on 
middle and high value added firms. As can be seen in table 15 
below, even micro-enterprises (less than 10 employees) and 
small businesses (11-50 employees) were involved in exporting 











Table 15: Exports by firm size 
I :NO OF WORKERS I AFRICA I UK/us I TOTAL I 
1-10 1 1 
11-50 1 1 
51-150 1 1 2 
151-300 1 1 
>300 1 2 3 
I 4 4 8 
Source: ow.n Surve I 1994 (n=LU) y 
This suggests that even smaller firms may have the potential 
to penetrate markets in neighbouring states. Stimulating 
exports (especially by SMEs) to other African countries is a 
policy.option which should be investigated further. 
As one would expect, only medium (51-300 errployees) and large 
{more than 300 errployees) firms were engaged in overseas 
sales. 
In order to assess the cashflow status of the firms under 
study, respondents were asked to describe the cashflow 
situation prevailing in the f inn. In table 16 this is shown as 
good, acceptable or poor. The table also illustrates the 
conditions of sale of output (either cash [CJ or terms [T]) 
and the conditions of purchasing inputs (also either cash or 
terms) . Firms were also asked to describe what sort of 
budgeting and cashflow procedures were irrplemented: either 
informal procedures, or sirrple, basic procedures or 
sophisticated corrputer based procedures. Access to credit was 
also examined: N = no access to bank credit; YN = bank credit 
having access to bank loans etc but do not use them by choice, 
Y = access to credit, but it is not used extensively, YE = 











Table 16: Cashflow and fi:cm strategies 
CASHFWW METHOD SELL BUY 
STATUS PRODUCT INPUTS 
Good Basic T T 
Good Basic T T 
Good Soph. T T 
Accept. Inf. c T 
Accept. Inf. c T 
Accept. Inf. c T 
Accept. Inf. c c 
Accept. Inf. T T 
Accept. Basic c c 
Accept. Basic T T 
Accept. Soph. T T 
Unsatisf. Inf. c c 
Unsatisf. Inf. c c 
Unsatisf. Inf. T c 
Unsatisf. Basic T T 
source: uw.n .surve , y 1994 (n-"2U) 
CREDIT NUMBER 
















The above table seems to suggest that cashf low management 
techniques seem not to be decisive in determining the health 
of the cashflow state, although they may enhance or detract 
from performance. 
Only 10% of the sarrple did not have access to credit 
facilities, 25% had access to bank credit facilities but did 
not use them, the remainder did use bank credit extensively. 
A more significant determinant of cashflow status seems to be 
the marketing strategy pursued by the firm. In the 15 firms 
whose cashflow situation was rated good or acceptable, the 
strategies followed were l] terms with both suppliers and 
customers; 2] cash to both suppliers and customers and 3] cash 
to customers and terms with suppliers and the use of 
overdrafts to cover bridging costs. These strategies decrease 
the need for overdraft and other facilities, by passing some 











one case where terms were extended to customers but suppliers 
demanded cash, cashflow was rated as unsatisfactory despite 
the availability of overdraft financing. Thus 16 out of 20 
cases can be "explained" by looking at the finn's pricing and 
purchasing policies. 
The effect of the availability or lack of access to credit 
facilities cannot be evaluated independently of the purchasing 
and pricing policies followed by the firms. Only in one 
instance did a lack of credit access impact negatively on the 
state of cashf lows but this was exacerbated by marketing 
policies that engender an extended lead time between cash 
outlays on inputs and cash receipts from sales. Overall, 
cashflow in the total sample is quite good, especially given 
that the industry is only beginning to emerge from a severe 
recession. However, this sample was quite small and may not be 
representative of the entire industry. In addition, only 
middle and high value added producers were sampled, and these 
tend to weather recessions better, by concentrating on a 
particular market niche. 
While nearly all the firms in the sample produce furniture 
which ultimately is aimed at the middle to upper income 
consumers, it is interesting to note which are the firms 
immediate customers and how this relates to marketing 
techniques used and choice of location. 
In the table below, FC denotes the final consumer, IR the 
independent retailers which are not part of the large retail 
chains, RC the retail chains, M component sales to other 
manufacturers, O denotes other customers. These would include 
restaurants, hotels and hospitals. There are, of course, firms 
which target two or more of these categories. In these cases, 
that market segment which constitutes the primary focus of the 
firm is placed first, followed by secondary market segments. 
The table thus gives a fairly good indicator of the way in 
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Table 17: The direct market of sampled fi:cns by location 
I CUSTOMER I Bl LI El TOTAL' 
FC 5% 10% 0% 15% 
IR/FC 10% 5% 5% 20% 
RC 5% 5% 5%' 15% 
IR/RC 5% 5% 0% 10% 
IR/RC/FC 0% 5% 5% 10% 
0 0% 5% 5% 10% 
FC/O 10% 0% 0% 10% 
RC/FC 0% 0% 5% 5% 
M 0% 5% 0% 5% 
I TOTAL I 35% I 40% I 25% I 100% 
source: own surve , y J.994 (n=20J 
More than half of the firms in the sarrple have a diversified 
target market. This has been partly as a result of the 
strategies firms have developed to deal with the prolonged 
recession. Direct contact with the final customer generates 
sales with higher margins than sales to the retailers. About 
45% of the sarrple sell directly to the final customer, either 
through showrooms or furniture factory shops. In the remaining 
cases the nature of the product (eg built-in cupboards and 
kitchens) necessitates direct sales to the final customer. 
40% of the total sample considered the independent retailers 
to be their principle market. In most cases this strategy was 
adopted by the smaller firms (either because they could not 
gain access to the large retailers or more of ten because they 
were not prepared to handle the lumpy demand, large volumes 
and stringent terms set by the large retail chains) . Makers of 
the more exclusive types of furniture tended also to sell 
direct to the final customer or the independents. This enables 
them to produce a highly customised product. 
Of the 8 firms who sold to the retail chains, 5 (63%) were 
sma.11 firms employing between 10 and 55 employees. Three of 
these were ve:ry well established firms under family control. 











is not concentrated .in any one social group. In fact, in this 
particular sample was an Indian, a Coloured and a White family 
controlled firm - all of which had three generations of 
experience in the furniture business. The average age of these 
businesses was 25 years, which suggests that the ability to 
build up a reputation for reliability and connections within 
the industry plays an important role in dealing successfully 
with the retail chains. 
The other 3 firm who sold to the retail chains (37%) all 
errployed more than 300 errployees, and were all older than 25 
years. Two of these were affiliated to a large furniture 
manufacturing group and the other was still family controlled. 
So it seems that the larger firms deal quite well with the 
retail chains, and also, more surprisingly, adequately 
capitalised, well established smaller firms. 
Only one firm (5% of the total sarrpl ) was engaged in the 
production of a component which was sold to other 
manufacturers for final assembly. This low figure indicates a 
distinct lack of vertical disaggregation so characteristic of 
the Third Italy. This issue is addressed in greater detail 
later on. 
The FS paradigm indicates that smaller firms can be 
corrpetitive where corrpetition is based on a range of factors 
(like quality and service) rather than solely price. Yet the 
definition of quality is extremely nebulous - for example one 
corrmonly quoted definition of quality is conformance to market 
requirements. In the survey respondents were asked what their 
critical success factors were (i.e. what distinguished their 
product from those of corrpetitors) . They were then asked to 
corrpare the prices of their products relative to corrpetitors. 
Firms were only regarded as corrpeting on quality or service if 
they specifically state that this was an element in their 
corrpetitive strategy and this allowed them to charge a premium 
on their product (their products conmanded a higher price than 
competitors in the same market) . The results are depicted 
below in table 18. Respondents were also asked to describe the 
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classified as low, medium or high. One would expect more 
quality oriented f inns to exhibit a medium or high degree of 
differentiation. 
·Table 18: Critical success Factors by price relative to 
competitors and Degree of product differentiation . 
I I PRI~I PRI~I PRI~I IDrAL~ LI Ml HI IDrALI 
Quality 0% 0% 30% 30% 0% 10% 20% 
Quality, 0% 5% 0% 5% 0% 15% 10% 
Service 
Service 0% 10% 20% 30% 5% 0% 5% 
Quality, Price 0% 10% 0% 10% 10% 10% 0% 
Price, 5% 10% 10% 25% 10% 5% 0% 
Quality/Service 
I rorAL I 5%1 35%1 60%1 100%11 25%1 40%1 35%11 
tiource: uwn survey, :.LYY4 (D=:.CU) 
In general, most of the respondents who claimed that 







,comnand a premium in the market. In certain segments this was 
very slight, in the most exclusive segments this was 
substantial. 60% of the total sample competed on quality or 
service and were able to· comnand a premium in the market. 
Service in this context refers mainly to reliability of 
delivery and after-sales rep~ir or replacement of defective 
products. These firms tended to be in market niches which 
required considerable capital outlay to enter, and thus 
competition, while still intense, is not as formidable as in 
the middle market where barriers to entry are much lower. 
In 35% of the total sample, firms competed on service and 
quality, sometimes together with price, but were not able to 
comnand a premium in the market. These firms tended to produce 
for the middle income markets which is reflected in their use 
of materials (composite boards rather than solid woods, 











nkinly involved in producing built-in cupboards (BICs) and 
kitchen units. In this market segment price competition is 
particularly fierce given the low barriers to entry. Built-in 
Cupboards require virtually no design ability, nor is 
~cialised machinery required to produce them. In fact the 
large suppliers cut boards to specification for little or no 
extra cost - so all the firm would have to do is to assemble 
and install the units. Retrenchments in furniture industry 
~oupled with the low barriers to entry, have made this segment 
particularly contestable and price sensitive. This is, as 
mentioned before, exacerbated by a low degree of product 
~ifferentiation. However, one firm in the sample produced 
'.'designer" kitchens with solid imported woods and irrported 
built-in appliances. The design-intensive nature of the highly 
customised product enables this firm to secure a substantial 
premium. 
As regards product differentiation and breadth of product 
range, the 65% of the sample who claimed to compete on quality 
and/or service, all (except one firm) displayed either a 
medium or high degree of product differentiation. Conversely, 
competition on price seems to be associated with less product 
differentiation, because of the nature of the product (BICS) 
or economies of scale from producing in large batches. 
~owever, the in-house design capacity of virtually all these 
firms are uniformly poor. The vast majority (70%) of firms use 
~nformal "back-of-an-envelope" design procedures. Only 20% of 
rirms sampled had formal prototype departments and these were 
~11 medium to large firms who sold to the retail chains. In 











Table 19: Methods of design 
I METHOD I FIRMS I PERCENT I 
Informal 14 70%" 
Prototype Dept 4 20%" 
Partner in design 2 10%" 
20 100%" 
Source: ow.n Survey, .L!:J94 (D=~U 
Given that the vast majority of firms do not possess 
significant inhouse design capacity, it is interesting to note 
what the sources of ideas for design are. 
Table 20: Sources of design by method of design 
Proto Mod CUst Overs D/DE ND Tradit 
INF 21.4%" 42.9%" 50.0%" 14.3%" 0%" 28.6%" 14.3%" n=14 
PD 100%" 25%" 50%" 50%" n=4 
DP 100%" 50%" 50%" n=2 
3ource: uw.n .survey, .L!:J !74 <n~~u) 
Of the firms who used informal design methods, just over 20%" 
did make use of prototypes. For this section, the most 
important sources of design are suggestions from customers 
(these include retail chains as well as final consumers), 
modification or copying of designs seen elsewhere, 14% 
produced traditional designs (eg Queen Anne, cape Cottage 
etc) . The product of others was such that very little design 
was required (eg BICs) and only 14%" followed overseas trends. 
Even in the larger firms, imitation seems to be the order 
of the day, only two of the firms employ a full-time designer 
or design engineer. 
All this seems to confirm South Africa's status as a 
follower in the furniture industry, rather than a design 
leader. This situation arose because all the firms are 
oriented primarily towards the local market. The South African 











markets with a lag. 'Thus catering to the domestic market did 
not require the development of design capacity - merely a 
subscription to an overseas magazine or occasional visits to 
overseas trade shows. 
Michael Porter's 11 demanding 11 and sophisticated customers, one 
- of the key pillars of the 11 diamond 11 paradigm, was completely 
absent in South Africa. While tariff structures etc limited 
the degree of foreign competition and finns were inwardly 
oriented this was not too great a disadvantage. But with 
increased foreign competition and attempts by local finns to 
break into overseas markets, this could be a major 
disadvantage, especially since there are externalities 
associated with design eg learning-by-doing, and reputation 
and brand recognition effects. 
In table 21, the relationship between finns and their 
customers were classified either as stable ongoing 
relationships (generally with the retail chains, independent 
retailers and regular final customers) or casual one-off 
relationships (final customers, hotels etc) . 
Table 21: Marketing media b  type of customer relationship 
Proto PC/WoM Ads Rep Shows CUst DB RC 
Stable 35% 45% 10% 10% 0% 20% 20% 
1 - off 0% 35% 30% 5% 10% 0% 0% 
'IDTAL 35% 80% 40% 15% 10% 20% 20% 
source: ow.n Survey, 199~ (n=.20 
'The use of personal contact between the entrepreneur and 
prospective customers and word of mouth was cited as important 
marketing methods by 80% of all respondents. In fact, in 25% 
of the sample this was the only form of marketing undertaken. 
'The f inns in question were generally well known and had 
established a reputation over the years. 
Most of the f inns who sold to the retail chains tended to 
have a stable (if not always amicable!) relationship with the 
chains. Use of prototypes, personal contact and sales 











that expenditure on marketing is relatively limited. Most 
retail chains also include the-manufacturer's name and logo in 
their brochures, at a small charge. 
For firms which serve a high income customer base, repeat 
customers are encouraged by making use of a customer database. 
Finns which sell to hotels and restaurants, etc, also corrpile 
installed lists of previous clients which are circulated on 
request among prospective customers. 
For firms who have a one-off relationship with their 
customers, advertising is relatively more irrportant, as can be 
seen in table 21. Here, word of mouth and referrals.from 
satisfied customers play an irrportant role. A small percentage 
of firms (10%) had also displayed exhibits at trade shows like 
the Design For Living Show. 
Having examined the firms' relationships with their 
customer bases, now the focus shifts to supplier 
relationships. Based on the premise that building stable 
relationships requires time, table 22 shows the nature of the 
supplier relationship and the age of the firm. 
65% of the total sample rep rted armslength relationships 
with their suppliers, shopping around for the best prices. The 
vast majority of these firms were very young, less than 8 
years old. Only one firm reported personal networks as a means 
of access to inputs (ie use of connections to obtain supplies 
at favourable rates) . 
Of the 25% of the sampled firms who reported stable 
relationships, all were older than 15 years old. One firm had 
been using the same suppliers for 35 years and described their 
relationship with their suppliers as "a good marriage" - and 
in this case there was even some evidence of innovation on the 
part of their suppliers, to meet the firm's specific 
requirements. 
Some of the larger fi:rms, however, tend to play suppliers off 
against each other to get more competitive prices. A corrment 
by one of the respondents illustrates this point quite vividly 
"We try to screw the suppliers for better prices all the time" 











to us as well" 36 • However, where certain core inputs were 
absolutely essential to production, relationships with these 
suppliers tended to be more stable. 
Table 22: SUpplier relations by firm age 
I REIATIONSHIP IAGE OF 
: FIRM (yrs) I 
NUMBER IPERc= 
I 
Stable > 15 5 25% 
Arms length 1-8 8 40% 
> 20 3 15% 
Play them off 7 1 5% 
> 20 2 10% 
Pers. Network 1.5 1 5% 
l'IOTAL I I 20 I 100% I 
Hource: uw.n Hurve y f 1994 (n-=20) 
As far as suppliers of business services was concerned, 85% 
of all firms in the sarrple outsourced maintenance. Most of the 
~11 firms made use of external bookkeepers and auditors, but 
the medium and larger firms all had separate accounting 
departments. 
There was surprisingly little variation in technology across 
enterprises. The rnicroenterprises made greater use of 
handtools, but nearly all of the small firms had industrial 
production machinery (eg spindles, band.saws, thicknessers etc) 
as well. The medium and larger firms used exactly the same 
industrial production machinery, but in greater quantities. 
Some firms did however possess certain highly specialised 
machines37 • In general, the uniformity in technology results in 
capital widening rather than capital deepening. 
one of the great advantages enjoyed by the furniture 
36 personal interview with Tania Ajarn, 7 September 1994 
37 For example, one small firm had machinery which could 
produce 6 fancy chair legs in 7 minutes. Each of these legs 












districts of the Third Italy is the existence (within the 
furniture clusters) of producers of machine:ry used in 
furniture manufacture. In fact Italy is one of the world 
leaders in woodworking machine:ry. The same can be said for 
Denmark - Kristensen (1992) describes how the structure of 
small machine shops means that prototypes and experimental 
production equipment can be developed quickly and this, of 
course, favours innovation. In the South African furniture 
indust:ry, most of the machine:ry is imported. This seems to be 
the rule rather than the exception for most South African 
industries and could be an important factor inhibiting future 
competitiveness. 
This lack of technological innovation is also evidenced in the· 
use of computers. Nearly half (45% of the total sample) did 
not use computers at all. Of the remaining 55% of the sample 
which did use computers, these were used mainly for 
administration (invoicing, wordprocessing etc) and accounts. 
The larger f inns also tend to use computers for invento:ry 
control and production planning, but not in the actual 
production process. 
Table 23: Ccmputer usage by fir.m size 
l~slNO IArfilN i= !INV !pp ICDST IMKT I CFW I EQUIP I 
1-10 40% 10% 10% 5% 
11-50 5% 10% 15% 10% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
50-100 15% 15% 
150-300 5% 5% 5% 5% 
> 300 10% 10% 10% 5% 
TOTAL 45% 50% 55% 25% 15% 5% 10% 5% 5% 
Source: own SUIVey, 1.994 (n=20) 
What is really interesting is that, of the 8 microenterprises 
in the sample, 2 (25% of all microenterprises and 10% of the 
total sample} use personal computers in managing the business. 
Besides using the personal computer for administration and 











:rUdimentary marketing system based on a customer record 
cfutabase. Another interesting observation is that in the case 
of these microenterprises, the entrepreneur's wife was 
c~uter literate and managed the business administration side 
o:f the business. In fact, in 25% of all businesses surveyed, 
the entrepreneurs• wives played valuable administration 
support roles and even, in some cases; assisted in marketing 
the firm's product. 
The most. outstanding example of innovation was encountered 
~n a small firm where the entrepreneur wrote and maintains a 
robust computer system which is used not only for 
administration 
and accounting purposes, but also for production planning and 
inventory. The inventory system is linked to a costing system 
which also warns when payments are falling due, hence 
assisting in cashflow forecasting. Finally the order 
administration is linked to a customer database which records 
Customer name, address, date and nature of the order as well 
as how the customer came to hear about the firm (eg referrals, 
~dverts etc) . This facilitates the construction of a customer 
profile which influences future marketing efforts. 
While a few of the firms surveyed felt that Computer Aided 
I?esign and Computer Aided Manufacture (CAD-CAM) were possible 
future opportunities, none were prepared to venture into it at 
this point. This risk-aversity is quite understandable when 
9ne considers the uncertainty surrounding technological 
7ransfer. This is exacerbated by a lack of in-house software 
support etc. 
In Italy, the family structure seems to operate as an 
intergenerational conduit for experiential 11 learning-by-doing 11 
knowledge (which would otherwise dissipate should the firm be 
cp.ssolved) and as a means whereby the linkages between the 
tirm, its suppliers, customers and "competitors" are 
strengthened over time. At the same time they retain a high 
degree of openness to innovative techniques introduced by sons 
~ho received a higher degree of technical training than their 











for continuous incremental u:pgrading. 
In South Africa, entrepreneurs heading family firms may 
have a lower level of fonnal training (despite being competent 
craftsmen) , and experience in production rather than 
management. If the family business is regarded as part of the 
patrimony to be protected and not exposed to undue risks, then 
surpluses derived from the business might be invested in 
tangible assets li,ke larger premises, real estate and other 
fixed assets rather than research and development, or other 
forms of intangible investment. For exarrple, one third 
generation family firm has achieved considerable success based 
on imitating designs or modifying them slightly, as well as 
producing products of a reasonable quality cheaply. However, 
most of the family profits have been channelled into 
acquisition of real estate. This is a classic case of 
insufficient infonnation, and could be an area of policy 
intervention. On the other hand, in another third generation 
family firm in the sample, the grandson had some engineering 
experience and was able to introduce several technological 
innovations, including a computer system which amongst other 
things keep track of tools and equipment for insurance 
purposes etc. On b~lance, it is extremely difficult to draw 
anything more than· tentative conclusions about the impact of 
family structures bn SME perfonnance. However, any type of 
industrial policy broadly consistent with the FS paradigm, 
would have to consider how to re-orientate existing societal 
structures towards dynamic innovation. In the furniture 
industry, certainly, this is definitely an area for further 
consideration. 
Respondents were asked if their firms had in the last 12 
months been able to invest in new machinery, skills upgrades 
or any other form of technology. Only 30% of the firms 
responded positively, most citing the prolonged recession as a 
factor inhibiting investment. Most investments made was in the 
acquisition of new machinery. Only one firm (5% of the sample) 
which was affiliated to a large furniture group reported 











All the f inns except one micro-enterprise paid their employees 
at wage rates at least equal to the minima set by the 
industrial council. Some of the microenterprises even paid 
more than the going rate to employees in lieu of non-wage 
benefits. The labour force was mainly coloured, and mostly 
males. -Females were engaged mainly in upholstery as 
seamstresses and for the final hand polishing of furniture - a 
task which requires some dexterity and cannot apparently be 
performed by machine. 
Most of the training received by workers was on-the-job 
training. A quarter of the sample (mainly the larger finns) 
did have formal apprenticeship programs as well. Most of the 
employees in the micro, small and medium-sized enterprises 
were extremely versatile and a considerable amount of job 
rotation takes place - very much in the "craft" tradition. 
Only in the very large enterprises was the production process 
broken down into single phases which a worker performed. For 
example a wood machinist used to be able to set up, maintain 
and operate his machine. The "mass production" approach would 
entail introducing a separate team of "setters" and 
"operators" etc. 
35% of the sample reported implementing no health and 
safety measures (these were mainly microenterprises and small 
businesses) . 35% of the sample (mainly small finns) reported 
basic precautions (eg covers on machinery, spraying masks, 
first aid kits etc - the bare minirrrum) . The remaining 30% of 
the sample had quite advanced health and safety procedures -
most of them had three star NOSA ratings. 
50% of all f inns reported extremely stable workforces with 
relatively low turnover rates. In some of the family-owned 
finns and individually owned finns, workers with a length of 
service oJ between 10 and 30 years were not unconmon. The 
industr~al relations style in most of these f inns has been 
paternalistic rather than conflictual in the past. However, 
many of the respondents perceive the recent increase in 
industrial action in the furniture industry as an erosion of 












or individually owned firms). 
ENTREPRENEuR PROFILES 
This section atten"Pts to give some idea of the background of 
entrepreneurs in the furniture trade, their educational 
attainments and ages. Of the 20 firms surveyed, in 16 cases 
the original founder of the business or his direct descendants 
were still running ithe business. This section deals with these 
16 respondents. 
Table 24: Entrepreneur education profile 
I HIGHEST S'ID I % of Entrepr. I 
6-8 18.75% 
6-8 & Apprent. 37.5% 
9-10 12.5% 
(technical) 
9-10 & Apprent 6.25% 
Diploma 6.25% 
Degree 6.25% 
overseas Appr 12.5% 
I 100 
Source: Own Surve I 1994 (n=lb) 
'!he most ccmnon c:rkr path for entrepreneurs was initially 
some sort of apprenticeship, followed by working in wage 
employment in the furniture or building industry for a period 
of time. Having accumulated sufficient experience, contacts 
within the trade and capital, started the entrepreneur goes on 
to establish his own business. 56,25% of all the entrepreneurs 
followed this route. 18.75 had attained matric and 12.5% had 
post matric qualifications. The distribution of fonnal 
education was roughly similar across population groups. The 
White entrepreneurs, however, did mention having gone to 
technical schools - an option not mentioned by any of the 
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93 
sample were male and this seems quite representative of the 
industry as a whole. 
Table 25: Age of entrepreneur by population group 
I AGE I w I I I c I TOTAL I 
21-24 6.25 6.25 
26-30 
31-35 6.25 6.25 
36-40 6.25 6.25 12.5 
41-45 6.25 6.25 12.5 
46-55 12.5 6.25 12.5 31.25 
>55 18.75 6.25 6.25 31.25 
I TOTAL I 56.25 I 18.75 I 25 I 100 I 
Source: own Surve I 1994 (n=l.6) y 
As shown in the above table, more than half of all the 
entrepreneurs surveyed were white, a quarter of the sample was 
coloured, the remainder being Indian. This was mainly due to 
the Group Areas restrictions which designated certain areas as 
available to certain population groups only. While the Act 
itself has been repealed, it did influence choice of location 
for the more enterprises established during its period off 
enforcement. Thus all of the entrepreneurs in Epping were 
White and the vast majority of entrepreneurs in Lansdowne were 
Indian or Coloured. 
Entrepreneurs were also asked to list the reasons why they 
were running their own businesses. Their responses are 











Table 26: Entrepreneurs• m:>tivation for involvement in the 
f i:nn 
REASONS FOR STARTING NO OF PERCENT 
FIRMS 
OWn Boss, Indep, Better prospects 7 43.75% 
Hobby, aptitude, satisfaction 4 25.00% 
Retrenchment 3 18.75% 
Family concern 2 12.50% 
16 100% 
Source: ow.n Survey, 1994 (n=20) 
This seems to indicate that the vast majority of the 
entrepreneurs sampled were prompted to start their own 
businesses for reasons of personal satisfaction (to be their 
own bosses, because they had a talent for woodworking etc), 
rather than in order to survive. 12% carried on the family 
business from their fathers and only 18% were forced, through 
retrenchment, to start their own businesses. These responses 
seem to confirm the impression gained in interviews that these 
entrepreneurs have highly individualistic goals and 
strategies . 38 
To cross-check the inference that "survivalist" motives 
were not the main reason for continuing to operate the 
business, entrepreneurs were asked whether they would accept 
wage employment if they were guaranteed incomes similar to 
those the businesses were generating. 81% of the 16 
entrepreneurs answered unequivocally no, which confirms the 
above conclusion. One of the respondents stated that he would 
accept wage employment, but doubted whether any firm would pay 
him the roughly R6 000 per month income the business was 
generating, given that he only had a Std 8 certificate. 
Another respondent would accept wage employment, but that he 
38 In the 4 larger firms in the sample, the current management were not 
the founders or owners of the enterprise. Although "corporate culture" is a 
nebulous concept and extremely subjective, the general irrpression gained was 












had trained his son to take over the business. Only one of the 
respondents really regretted going into business on his own. 
Even those entrepreneurs who had entered the industry as a 
result of retrenchment generally would not accept wage 
employment. Entrepreneurs were also asked to describe what 
background they had had in the industry prior to running their 
own businesses. 
Table 27: Entrepreneur's background in the furniture industl:y 
I BACKGROUND IN INDUSTRY I NUMBER I PERCENT! 
Family 3 18.75% 
Worked in a factory 8 50.00% 
Hobby 2 12.50% 
Building Industry 2 12.50%
No background 1 6.25% 
I 'IDTAL I 16 I 100% I 
source: ow.n survey, 1.994 (n=2U) 
This question is very similar to the one on reasons for 
ptarting the business, and the responses generally correspond 
with that of the previous question. 
The picture of these entrepreneurs are that they have at least 
10 years of formal schooling, often supplemented by an 
apprenticeship and long work experience. More than half were 
older the age of 45 and nearly all had entrepreneurial rather 
than survival motivations for starting the business. 
ENTERPRISE LINKAGES: 
Firms were asked whether they were involved in any sort of 
· subcontracting for another firm. In the strictest sense of the 
word, subcontracting refers to a situation where the party 
offering the subcontract requests another independent 
~nterprise (the subcontractor) to fulfil either partially or 
fully an order it has received instead of producing itself to 
meet the order. There is generally also a contract between the 











quantity and other specifications), which distinguishes 
subcontracting from the purchase of ready-made corrponents. The 
definition used here is very broad and would include 
subcontracting based on verbal or informal contracts as well 
as any other forms of vertical disaggregation (defined loosely 
in this instance as all other forms of production of an 
intermediate good which is an input to another phase of the 
production process) . 
The greatest proportion (65%) of the total sample did not 
subcontract for any other enterprise. A quarter of the firms 
surveyed did occasionally subcontract for other parties, but 
this constituted only a minuscule proportion of total output. 
Here the motive for subcontracting rests mainly on personal 
relations - it is done more or less as a favour by the 
entrepreneur to other manufacturers he knows quite well. The 
reasons why these transaction takes place is either because 
the respondent has specialised machinery not available to 
those he subcontracts for, or because the respondent engages 
in a phase of the process which is complementary to that of 
the party he is subcontracting for (eg. an upholsterer would 
upholster a frame for another party) . 
In only 10% of the firms was subcontracting for other 
enterprises a major form of revenue - both involved in making 
components which were sold to other firms for final assembly -
the one firm specialised solely in cupboard doors (sold to 
other manufacturers) , and the other produced the wooden part 
of pine kitchen units, to which a hardware chain added a metal 
sink and sold. Given that only a very limited subset of the 
total sample were engaged in subcontracting as a primary . 
source of income generation, it is very difficult to draw any 
definite conclusion from the empirical evidence regarding the 
nature of subcontracting relationships (ie capacity enhancing 
or exploitative) in the region as a whole. However, in the two 
instances sampled, subcontracting was clearly profitable. The 
entrepreneurs in question did retain a considerable degree of 
independence by subcontracting for several firms 












Table 28: Enterprises acting as subcontractors by location 
; 
c I 'B I.J :·E TOTAL 
No subcontracting 10%- 35%- 20% 65%-
Occasionally 20%- 0%- 5-!1,. .0 25%-
Yes 5%- 5%- og,.. ·o 10%-
I TOTAL I. 35%- I 40%- I 25%- I 100%- I 
Source: OvJ.rJ surve y , 1.994 (n=20J 
None of the firms in Epping subcontracted for other firms, and 
only a small proportion of those in Lansdowne. However within 
the Blackheath hive, 70%- of the firms were engaged in 
subcontracting for other firms in the vicinity. Thus there 
seems to be a denser transactional web in the Blackheath hive. 
This is quite remarkable given that the hive is, in a sense, 
an artificial agglomeration. Here spatial proximity does seem 
to have played a role in diminishing transaction costs, but 
this seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
dense transactional networks. In Lansdowne and Epping most of 
the respondents were literally a stone's throw away, yet in 
these cases mere proximity did not result in any "thickening" 
of transactional relationships. 
Firms were then asked whether they subcontracted out any of 
their own production. About 50%- did, and they were asked their 
reasons for subcontracting out. In most cases the 
subcontracted work either did not constitute a major 
proportion of output, or work was not subcontracted out on a 











Table 29: Reasons for subcontracting out 
I REASON FOR SUBCONTRACTING I NO OF FIRMS I PERCENT' 
Complementary 5 50% 
Demand smoothing 3 30% 
Family 1 10% 
Cost 1 10% 
10 100% 
Source: Ov\7.11 Surve , y 1994 (n=lOJ 
The major reason for subcontracting is that the subcontractor 
could perform either a complementary phase in the production 
process39 or because the subcontractor produced a product which 
complemented the subcontracting party' s product line40 • 
30% of those who did subcontract mentioned demand smoothing 
as reasons for subcontracting. These were generally larger 
firms which, due to an upswing in demand, find themselves 
capacity constrained. 
Two other minor reasons for subcontracting were because the 
subcontractor could produce at a lower cost, and secondly 
because the subcontractor was a family member who could be 
relied upon. 
Nobody mentioned cur ently using subcontracting as a means 
of reducing wage related costs (eg administration costs, 
reduction of expenditure on health and safety and non-wage 
benefits etc) . However one of the larger companies suggested 
that this was an option which could not be entirely rejected 
in the future, given the increased industrial action in the 
furniture industry. Another related issue is the question of 
down-sizing. One of the small family owned firms mentioned the 
possibility of retrenching their entire workforce and starting 
39 As mentioned before, a furniture manufacturer producing period 
furniture frames, for instance, would subcontract that out, or a firm 
producing solid oak kitchens would subcontract out the polished marble tops 
etc 
4° For example, one enterprise specialised in the production of chairs 
only. Yet, in order to provide the customer with a "package deal" they would 












up again on a much smaller scale should wage pressures 
threaten the viability of the enterprise. Another individually 
owned finn in the sarrple had already done so. It is not 
possible to ascertain how widespread this phenomenon has been 
in the past, but it merits further investigation. 
The remaining respondents in the sample (50%) who did not 
subcontract out at all were asked to provide reasons why they 
did not do so. These are surnnarised in table 30 below: 
Table 30: Reasons for not using subcontractors 
REASON FOR NOT SUBCONTRACT NO OF FIRMS PERCENT 
Std of Quality, Delivery 6 60% 
Nature of product i 3 30% 
Personal preference 3 30% 
Insufficient Volume 2 20% 
Stealing of Designs 1 10% 
,:;,ource: uw.n survey, 1.994 (n....:1.1 ') 
The major reason for not making use of subcontracting is 
uncertainty about whether subcontractors could produce to the 
agreed upon quality and delivery specifications (60% of the 
respondents) . The monitoring costs involved were thus 
considered prohibitive. 
About 30% of all respondents described the nature of their 
product as being too simple to allow much vertical 
disaggregation - for example those manufacturers who were 
already producing components or those producing melamine BICs 
which are basically just boxes . 
. 30% of the respondents cited a personal preference for and 
satisfaction from undertaking the entire production process. 
Other reasons for not subcontracting included that the 
;respondent did not produce sufficient quantities of a single 
product to make it worthwhile to engage a subcontractor (again 
the perception here is of subcontracting as demand smoothing) . 
Finally, one respondent did mention the possibility of 












A respondent firm which did engage in subcontracting, 
mentioned that it would like to increase the volume of 
subcontracts, but that it was uncertain as to the status of 
subcontracting, given that the Industrial Council agreement 
prohibits outwork (and piece-work) . 
Respondents were then askea whether they participated in 
any other forms of inter-firm cooperation41 , besides issues 
relating to subcontracting. 70% reported no other forms of 
cooperation at all. 15% reported some sort of information 
sharing on an informal basis with other manufacturers. The 
remaining 15% cooperated mainly through the borrowing of 
equipment and with regard to access to inputs. So the level of 
interf irm cooperation is very low_. Information is seen as 
something to be hoarded. Horizontal cooperation was virtually 
absent in the sample. Across all firm sizes competition was 
described as cut-throat. One manufacturer aptly summed up the 
prevalent attitude: "We don't go to bed with our suppliers 
1142 
msTITUTIONAL COOPERATION 
Having examined the extent of inter-firm cooperation (or lack 
thereof!), this section will briefly focus on institutional 
cooperation. The experience of the Third Italy, Denmark and 
other industrial districts have underscored the important role 
of various institutions (both formal and informal, public and 
private sector) in engendering inter and intra-firm 
cooperation. 
Respondents from firms in the sample were asked whether they 
were affiliated to any industry association. The responses of 
41 This was an extremely difficult point on which to elicit information. 
Virtually all respondents said they did not cooperate at all initially, but 
w4en asked if they did this, or that, turned out to be cooperating after all, 
albeit to a limited extent! 
42 Personal interview with Tania Ajam, 7 September 1994 











firms are represented below: 
Table 31: Affiliation to industry associations by firm size 
I AFFILIATION I 1-101 11-sol s1-15ol >1501 TOTAL I 
FURN IC 5% 15 0% 0% 20% 
BUILD IC 5% 5 0% 0% 10% 
CFMA/Ch.Com 0% 15 5% 15% 35% 
BTA 5% 0 0% 0% 5% 
NO 30% 0 0% 0% 30% 
I TOTAL I 45% I 35% ! 5%1 15% I 100% I 
bource: uw.n t1u.rve , 1994 y (n-=:.CU) 
There is a surprisingly high degree of linkages to industrial 
bodies: 65% of all the firms in the sam.ple were party to the 
Furniture Industrial Council, the Building Industry Council, 
and the Chamber of Corrmerce and/or the cape Furniture 
Manufacturers association. Only the microenterprises reported 
ho affiliations to any outside entity (30% of the total 
sample) . One third of all microenterprises in the sample 
reported that they were affiliated to the Industrial Councils 
or the Black.heath Tenants Association in the Black.heath Hive. 
This high degree of linkage is mainly due to the fact that 
firms are legally obliged to be party to the Industrial 
Council once a threshold limit of 4 errployees is attained43 • It 
is interesting to contrast this high degree of affiliation 
with the perceptions furniture manufactures have of these 
organisations. 
Respondents were asked if they felt _that these organisations 
represented their interests adequately. 
43 
Certain SBDC Industrial Hives are exempted from various provisions of 
the Wage Act, Basic Conditions of Errployrnent Act and the Machinery and 












Table 32: Entrepreneur sentiment with regard to existing 
industrial associations and their representivity 
I RESPONSE I NO OF FIRMS I PERCENT' 
Big f inns only 2 10.5% 
No 2 10~5% 
No benefits 3 16% 
No experience/Don't know 7 37% 
Indifferent 2 10.5 
Yes 2 10.5 
Other (participation) 1 5% 
bOurce: b'urvey, 19.!14 (n=l;;J J 
The attitude of manufacturers to these organisation was quite 
negative in general. 37% of the sample felt that industry 
associations were not representative of their interests. These 
were mainly rnicroenterprises and small businesses who either 
felt that these associations were geared to the needs of 
bigger businesses exclusively. Medium-sized business complain 
that they are forced to pay the same levies as the larger 
firms without seeing any comnensurate benefits44 • 
48% of the respondents answered that they did not know if 
these organisations were representative of their interests or 
had had no experience with them on which to base a judgement 
or were simply indifferent. This lack of interest seems to 
reflect the perception that the associations are primarily 
instruments of collective bargaining, rather than active in 
promoting the interests of the smaller enterprise in 
particular (ie in addressing pressing sectoral or regional 
problems). 
10.5% of the respondents felt that these organisations did 
represent their interests adequately, as a source of marketing 
information and reasonably priced training courses. One 
44 A typical response of the owner of small business: 
"They just take your money and offer you nothing ... We pay subs to them but I 
can't see what they do ... I pay training levies - Never did anyone train 











respondent gave a very qualified yes, pointing that there was 
not enough participation from the part of manufacturers 
themselves. 
Respondents were also asked if they had received any form 
of assistance from any small business institution. All those 
enterprises situated in the Blackheath Hive (30% of the 
sample) obviously had some sort of contact with the SBDC 
(which provided access to premises, loans and machinery) . In 
addition to those firms in the Hive, 10% of the total sample 
had received some form of assistance from the SBDC in the 
past. None of the rest of the sample reported having received 
any such assistance. 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
Finally, respondents were asked what they considered to be 
opportunities and threats/problems for their firm and/or the 
furniture industry in the Western Cape. 
50% of manufacturers in the sample cited the Reconstruction 
and Development Program (RDP) with its emphasis on increased 
housing and employment creation as a possible source of 
increased future domestic demand and 5% the allied possibility 
of increased government contracts to small businesses. 15% of 
the firms surveyed were keen to increase their export share 
and so become less dependent on the South African market. When 
prompted about the imninent decrease in tariffs in order to be 
GA.TT consistent, 15% of the sample felt this to be an 
opportunity since it would bring down the price of imported 
timbers. 15% of the sample of mainly small firms intended to 
diversify their product ranges in the future. 
The threats can be broadly separated into those affecting 
micro-enterprises and those affecting the small, medium and 
large firms. 62% of all the microenterprises (8) in the sample 
experienced problems with the high prices of inputs or the 
fact that they could not obtain credit from suppliers. 50% of 
the microenterprises were experiencing a lack of demand for 
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payments or defaults by their debtors as a problem. Interest 
payments were also seen as a source of risk and uncertainty 
for small finns. 
Only 25% of the sarrple felt that lowering of tariffs would 
irrpact on their own market significantly. The rest felt mainly 
that it would not affect built-in furniture, or that the 
respondent f inn was located in a high value added niche 
relatively well insulated from any potential onslaught. 
The most widely perceived threat/problem is seen to arise 
from labour related issues. 30% of the sarrple, mainly small 
finn see the trade unions as a threat. 25% of the respondents 
had concerns about future worker productivity and work ethics. 
10 of the finns felt that skills shortages could very well 
happen in the future. And finally, 60% of all sarrpled 
manufacturers quoted the current wage structure in the 
furniture industry as a current and futur  problem (describe 
in chapter 4) . 
The above survey results seem to indicate that different 
sets of constraints operate on microenterprises and small, 
medium and large finns. Clearly, no single policy prescription 
will be able to address all segments of the industry 
simultaneously. This suggests that policy should not only be 













The details described in the previous chapter paint a picture 
of the three different localities. The Blackheath Hive, in a 
sense an "artificial" agglomeration with a critical mass of 
sectorally concentrated microenterprises45 shows signs of 
incipient economies of agglomeration and a denser web of 
transactional relationships between those firms located in the 
hive. Yet this small finn "cluster" can hardly be tenned 
;' locally embedded, in the sense that there is a distinct 
overlap in the productive and social lives of the corrmunity, 
or socially cohesive institutions to underpin economic 
decentralisation. The Lansdowne area does exhibit slightly 
more local embeddedness, but while external economies are 
present, economies of agglomeration are almost completely 
absent. Much the same can be said for the Epping location. 
If the principle aim of this survey were to establish 
whether the the small f inn variant of flexible specialisation 
exists or merely to gauge the deviation of actual conditions 
from the ideal type, then this conclusion would contain 
noth~ng except affirmation of an a priori conviction that FS 
does not exist, and that virtually all the features of the 
ideal typical model are absent from the three locations under 
scrutiny. 
However, the central thrust of this paper has been to gain 
some understanding of the nature of the process of the firms' 
interaction with their suppliers, customers and with other 
firms within a particular institutional and locational 
context. The FS methodology was used as a systematic approach 
to investigating these processes, since (as has been discussed 
previously) it focusses on several important elements that had 
been somewhat neglected before (eg linkages, inter-finn 
cooperation and competition etc) . 
Examining these processes, a number of critical issues have 
surfaced, which should be addressed by the industry at a . 
45 At the time this survey was conducted, there were 20 finns in the 











sectoral level. Because this study aims at identifying the 
funliture manufacturers' perceptions of the· 
problems/opportunities confronting them, it may not capture 
all the underlying causes of these problems. Ideally this 
analysis, should be supplemented by studies of both the 
suppliers.and the furniture retail sector to get a more 
balanced view of the dynamics within the industry as a whole, 
and possible even related industries as well (eg woodworking 
tools etc). However, the areas identified for policy 
consideration include: 
1] THE INSTITOTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Of the furniture manufacturing finns interviewed, 60% 
perceived the rigidity of wage structures to be a problem. 
While particularly the small businesses perceived the level of 
wages to be a problem (i.e big employers and the unions 
negotiated tenns which were not affordable to the struggling, 
recession-hit smaller firms) , it is the rigid structure of 
wages that is likely to have a negative impact on the 
industry. As discussed in greater detail in chapter 3, the. 
minimum wages set down in the Industrial Council (IC) 
agreement are linked to the performance of a particular phase 
of production within a designated trade (upholstery, 
woodcarving etc) . So the IC agreement would state that 
employees engaged in boring holes should earn at least R262,90 
a week, that an employee engaged in applying wax should earn 
at least R242,00, that an employee engaged in sewing mattress 
handles to borders should earn R256,30 etc. Smaller 
enterprises often, through on-the job instruction, teach an 
employee competence in a single phase, but then are obliged to 
pay (multi-phase) artisan rates. On the other hand, the union 
argues that "if you do the work, you must be paid the IC rate 
(and not less)" (Dumpies,1994). 
One effect of this type of wage structure is that it 
provides a disincentive for the acquisition of ,further 












proponents of the FS paradigm. This would prove to be in the 
interest of neither the manufacturers nor the employees in the 
long run. 
By allowing microenterprises exemption from paying, for 
instance, training levies, this would most likely result in 
microenterprises.being even more remote from training 
institutions at a stage in their development when they most 
need this sort of input. Eventually, once the firm starts 
growing and the threshold is reached, the firm would have to 
contend with making the various contributions it is legally 
obliged to, all in one go. 
One suggestion for dealing problems like these, has been 
the suggestion that a system of collective bargai ing needs to 
be developed which is appropriate to the small business 
sector: 
Within the Industrial council context, it could give rise to sectoral 
agreements applicable exclusivel~ to small businesses as defined in 
the course of collective bargaining) in each industry, that would 
make fewer demands on errployers and contain fewer benefits for 
workers than the agreements applicable to the remainder of those 
industries. 
{Du Toit, 1993) 
However, this presupposes some sort of representative 
industrial association which could represent the interests of 
smaller firms as well as a high degree of trade union 
representation in small firms (like in Denmark and the Third 
Italy) . Both of these are largely absent from the three 
locations investigated in this study. 
Whether options like these are at all feasible should be the 
topic of debate among participants in the industry. There is 
already a growing awareness that these vital labour-related 
















2] SMALL BUSlNESS m8TITOTIONS 
Most of the microenterprises and small businesses in the 
sanple did not have any problems accessing credit - in fact a 
large proportion pref erred not to use overdraft facilities 
etc. Their main problem is seen as the terms on which they 
purchase inputs from suppliers. 
This suggests that in order to assist the potentially more 
dynamic firms, provision of "real services" such as marketing, 
design, technological upgrading and training should be offered 
on a sector specific basis46 • For example the Department of 
Wood and Furniture of the Danish Institute of Technology 
carries out applied research in the properties of wood, 
processes relating to wood, computer aided design etc. They 
have also developed advisory programmes to assist in 
transferring this technology to SMEs in an economic manner. 
The programmes cover quality development, productivity 
development and networking. 85% of the firms which use these 
programs have less than 50 employees (Danish Institute of 
Technology, 1993) . 
This has also implications for counties donating funds towards 
SME support in South Africa - gaining access to this type of 
expertise and the opportunity to use "real service centres" 
like these as models, could be as important, if not more so, 
than monetary assistance alone. 
For example, the results of this survey showed that even 
microenterprises and small businesses were spontaneously 
engaging in exports to Namibia and other neighbouring states. 
The provision of marketing intelligence (which is virtually 
costless on the margin when distributed on a large scale) 
could overcome information asyrrmetry and encourage exports. 
Once again this information would have to be sector specific. 
46 The White Paper on a national strategy for the pranotion of small 
business (DTI,1995) does envisage a nationwide network of local service 











3] INDUSTRY ASSOCIATIONS 
Existing associations within the fu:rniture industry generally 
have a negative image in the industry as being mainly 
instruments of collective bargaining. The fu:rniture industry 
will be undergoing quite a few challenges in the near future 
eg the lowering of tariffs,and the possibility of an influx of 
cheap imported fu:rniture, to name but one. These changes will 
most likely affect the majority of participants in the 
industry. Without some fonn of effective and credible 
industrial associations, it will be extremely difficult to 
fonnulate a strategic vision for the furniture industry. 
Industry associations cannot be responsive to the needs of the 
manufacturers (eg training, marketing and technology) unless 
business people (from all segments of the industry) actively 
participate in shaping the policy of these institutions. On 
the other hand, unless businesspeople can actually see real 
benefits emanating from links with such associations, it is 
unlikely they will join them. Compelling membership by law is 
unlikely to engender the type o  collective action seen in 
Italy and Denmark. 
Joffe et al (1993) have mentioned the possibility of public 
funds to strengthen employer associations and facilitate 
technological upgrading. Unfortunately those small enterprises 
in the middle and higher value added segments which are most 
likely to benefit from this type of intervention (vis-a-vis 
survivalist enterprises) may not be considered worthy of 
public assistance, and even if they were, they would have to 
compete with other socially imperative claims on the fiscus. 
For the foreseeable future, these types of initiatives will 
probably have to be funded by sources internal to the 
industry. 
3] TECHNOLOGY, TRArnING .AND BUSINESS SKILLS 
This study has indicated that small and microenterprises are 
extremely risk averse in relation to experimenting with new 
technology and inputs, and a case can be made for holding 











to see what benefits can be derived from these innovation. 
The results of the survey indicate that in a relatively high 
proportion of the total sample (25%), the business 
administration side of the operating the enterprise was in 
actual fact being managed by the owner's wife. Often it was 
the wife who was computer literate and had the business skills 
to complement her artisan husband's production competency. 
This suggests that business skills transfer programs should be 
aimed not only at those who owri the enterprises, but also 
those who actually perform these functions within the 
business. 
While more small business support is currently being 
channeled into starting up micro-enterprises, it has become 
clear from the study that more established small businesses of 
around 6 to 8 years old and employing between 10 and 50 
employees also need marketing, training and technological 
support. On the other hand, most consulting firms do not cater 
for the smaller firms, and even if they did, the cost would 
probably be prohibitive for smaller firms. One option could be 
the introduction of "network brokers", or part-time 
consultants who could be assisting several.small firms in a 
"cluster" at the same time. If small-scale manufacturing is to 
be seen as a viable source of sustainable employment in the 
Western Cape, this segment cannot be ignored, even if their 
owners come from groups that are regarded as privileged or not 
sufficiently disadvantaged to merit public assistance. 
At present none of the technikons or universities in the 
Western Cape offer full courses in furniture design. This is 
partly due to a lack of demand from the furniture 
rnanuf acturing industry which is a follower rather than a 
leader in design. Any attempt to increase export market share 
would necessitate building local design capacity. In this 
area, industry associations could play a vital role at 
regional level in making local educational institutions 
sensitive to the needs of the industry. 











The results of the survey indicates that the major reason for 
subcontracting out is because the subcontractor could perform 
a complementary phase in the production process or produce a 
product which could complement the subcontracting party's 
product range. In addition the single most important factor 
inhibiting increased subcontracting are the costs associated 
with monitoring quality and delivery standards. 
Taken together, they suggest that once again information 
dissemination is critical - especially about the specialities 
of smaller firms within the production process, possibly in 
some sort of sectorally and regionally specific database. But 
information alone is unlikely to make much impact. Those 
dynamic small firms which are well linked to their suppliers 
and customers etc, have spent years in cultivating a 
reputation for reliability and quality. There is likely to be 
no quick-fix in this regard, but in the long term, the only 
way subcontracting which is beneficial to both contractual 
parties can emerge, is by addressing the underlying issues of 
quality and reliability, which of course comes back to 
training. 
Another important·issue is that uncertainty about the 
extent to which the Industrial Council agreement permits 
subcontracting. The Industrial Council restricts outwork and 
piecework, but at present the status of subcontracting is not 
so clear, especially to smaller firms. There needs to be 
clarity in terms of definitions, since these concepts do 
overlap considerably. 
5] INDUSTRIAL HIVES 
The FS paradigm suggests that geographic and sectoral 
I 
concentration can result in economies of agglomeration and 
hence collective efficiency. The SBDC Blackheath industrial 
hive seems to have reached a critical mass of sectorally and 
geographically small furniture producers, and some form of 
economies of agglomeration does seem to be emerging. But this 
was not really planned to be this way. An interesting 











Only relatively dynamic fi:rms would be allowed access, and 
market rates would be charged to eliminate adverse selection. 
The real advantage for these fi:rms would be access to highly 
specialised "real producer services" eg design and prototyping 
services, sector specific marketing intelligence on local and 
foreign furniture trends, joint marketing etc. This is 
particularly feasible since many respondents claim that 
location is not really the most decisive factor anyway, and 
some fi:rms in the sarrple intended to move. If this is so, 
relocation would not present a major problem. 
The above are only a few of the challenges that are likely to 
face the furniture industry in the future. It is by no means 
exhaustive. Benton (1992:83) maintains that the use of the 
industrial districts/FS concept is best used as a tool for 
investigating similar processes of industrial change rather 
than a model to be slavishly replicated: 
The first approach leads logically to a more carplex understanding of 
policy intervention. Rather than developing a list of policy 
prescriptions to ~ranote flexible specialisation and the 
consolidation of industrial districts, we can serve policy-makers 
best by identifying the political ~rocesses that guide industrial 
restructuring and by helping them in the intensive fieldwork needed 
to evaluate the likely effects of particular measures on specific 
patterns representing those processes. This ap~roach may not prove 
satisfying to many technocrats because it irrplies a need to engage in 
dialogue and joint planning with industry participants rather than 
merely dictating policy changes, but it is the only strategy worth 
pursw.ng. 
If sectoral case studies like these can help advance these 
objectives by assisting policy-makers and industry 
participants, rather than being merely academic exercises, the 
time and effort spent on them and the methodology used is 











APPENDIX 1: EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ECONOMIES 
Internal economies are cost-reducing relationships within a 
plant or firm, whereas external economies concern cost-
reducing relationships which extend beyond the boundaries of 
plant or firm. Both internal and external economies may be 
further subdivided into economies of scale and scope. 
Economies of scale generally arise from technological and 
organisational indivisibilities, and are engendered by 
increases in the level of economic activity. Scope effects, on 
the other hand, derive from the "positive and negative 
transactional relations that are established between different 
units of productive activity" (Scott, 1988: 19) and are 
engendered by the number of different activities undertaken. 
THE GENESIS OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ECONOMIES 
SCALE SCOPE 
Level of output in Variety of 
INTERNAL firm or different tasks 
establishment performed in firm 
or establishment 
Number of producers Variety of 
EXTERNAL in complex or producers in 
agglomerat on complex or 
agglomeration 
source: scor:r: & b'CO er, 1992: 7 
Traditionally, economic theory has concentrated on internal 
economies of scale (where unit costs fall as output increases 
inside the plant or firm) and internal economies of scope 
(achieved by firms large enough to engage efficiently in 
multi-product production and associated large scale 
purchasing, distribution, and advertising. 
The FS literature places great emphasis on external 
economies of scale which arise from inter-firm specialisation 
and the growth of output of a series of allied firms eg where 
specialist suppliers experience economies of scale not 
realisable within the principle firm itself. External 
economies of scope may also be associated with 
complementarities in production. Storper (1991) cites an 











automated pack.aging machines economically viable and thus 
reduce the production costs not only of the detergents, but of 
the machines as well. The fall in the cost of machines may 
render their use in the making of cornflakes and cocoa, etc 
profitable. 
-Changes in technology or in market conditions may cause 
the dissipation of internal economies of scale, giving rise to 
horizontal integration in which producers of any one type 
become smaller and more numerous, tending to increase external 
economies of scale. Internal economies of scope may also decay 
resulting in vertical disintegration 
(the fragmentation of the production chain, from the 
transformation of raw inputs to the final output, into a 
number of distinct processes each performed by a separate 
production unit) or social (inter~firm) division of labour. 
Under which conditions would internal economies of scope 
be negligible or negative (i.e. diseconomies of scope), which 
would therefore be conducive to vertical disintegration ? 
Storper (1991: 12) lists a few: 
l] It may be technologicall~ p ssible to disa$gregate 
different labour processes in production out into specialised 
units of production, if they cannot be synthesized or 
integrated into unified machine systems 
2] If markets are fluctuating or unforeseeable, -large firms 
may subcontract certain activities to avoid the transmission 
of variability or uncertainty through the vertical structure 
of the firm. Under conditions of market volatility, vertically 
disintegrated batch production may be a feasible alternative 
to centralised vertically integrated production. 
3] If producers for final markets need intermediate inputs 
which can most efficiently be fabricated by firms entirely 
dedicated to these inputs because of their firm-specific know-
how 
4] If these inputs can be made in factories whose minimal 
optimal scales of production can only be attained if their 
production is marketed to a variety of downstream firms, 
vertical disintegration will lower costs 
5] Large firms with internal labour markets or unionised 
labour may also ~ut out certain phases in the ~roduction 















Position within the irm: 
THE ENTERPRISE 
Name of enterprise: 
Form of ownership: 
Major product line/s: 
Monthly volume of prOduction: 
Location of enterprise: 
Why was this location chosen? 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
How many other enterprises in the furniture sector are also in 
this ge0$Taphic vicinity? 
How old is the enterprise?~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
How did the enterprise operate at start-up and what maJor 
c:::hanses in.operation and organisation have taken place since 
its inception ? 
How does the enterprise operate now ? 











How is the business management side of the enterprise handled 
(eg accounting, billing customers etc) 
What is the cashflow situation of the firm at present? Do you 
think that it could be improved by management techniques like 
budgeting etc? 
Are work prenu.ses adequate? 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Monthly Turnover (In Thousands of rands) 
Below 20 000 20 - 35 000 36 - 50 000 51 - 65 000 
66 - 75 000 75 - 90 000 90 - 100 000 100 - 300 000 
301 - 500 000 
If above R 500 000, please specify 
~~~~~~~~~~~~-
THE MARKET 
Which market segments does the ente~rise target (eg 
low/middle/high income markets for final consumers)?~~~~-
What does the entrepreneur perceive as her/his critical 
success factors on which competition is based eg 
(price,quality, after-sales service etc)? 
What role do personal/business networks play in the marketing 
process (eg in attracting customers)? What other forms of 
marketing does the firm engage in? 
Is production order-driven or are prOducts manufactured in 
advance and then marketed? 
How do you price your product? 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-












What type of inputs does the firm use? ~~~~~~~~~~~-
To what extent do personal and business network facilitate 
access to inputs (supplier relations)? 
What t~es of tools and equipment are in use? Are these 
mechanised? Can the same set of tools have general purpose 
applications? 
How freely available is access to electricity, telephones, 
fax, transport and other facilities? ~~~~~~~~~~~~-
What design capabilities (if any) does the firm have at its 
disposal, or is the product range centred on imitation and 
traditional designs? 
How have tools and other forms of techriology chariged since the 
firm started? 
Has the entrepreneur been at all able to invest in new 
machinery/ skills upgrades or other forms of investment in 
technology within the last 12 
months? 
Does the firm use personal computers for accounting, 
wordprocessing etc? What types of off ice equipment are used? 
THE ENTREPRENEUR 
Highest std of schooling reached (std 5 or below, std 6 - 8, 
std 9-10, diplomas or other qualifications? 
What is the background of the entrepreneur, any formal 
qualifications in the furniture trade? 











How were these setup costs initially financed (eg bank credit, 
family support etc)? 
What is the current monthly income of the entrepreneur? 
Would the entrepreneur accept wage emplo¥ment if the wage 
offer was equivalent to his/her current income from the 
business? 
What are prospects for succession? 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
What is the social group of the entrepreneur? 
Existence of social sanction and other forms of exit costs? 
Age of the entrepreneur: 
20 or below 21 - 25 years 
36 - 40 years 41 - 45 years 
LlNKAGES 
26 - 30 years 
45 -55 years 
31 - 35 years 
above 55 years 
What linkages does the small enterprise have with other 
enterprises eg technical, maintenance, distribution etc? Does 
inter-firm cooperation (eg in the form of borrowing tools or 
recomnending customers to a fellow entrepreneur who 
specialises in a form of furniture) take place? 
If there are several firms in the same location, do informal 
restrictions on competition exist eg informal price floors? 
Does the firm subcontract for any other firm (eg retailers)? 
Why/Why not? 












Is the highly concentrated network of retailers (with their 
high degree of backward integration and inhouse sourcing) 
perceived by entrepreneurs to be a major obstacle? 
How does the firm obtain inputs - how are supplier relations 
with regard to terms, credit etc? / 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Is the firm affiliated to any industry associations (eg Cape 
Furniture Association)? 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Does the entrepreneur feel that existing associations 
adequately promote the interests of small and medium-sized 
firms? 
What linkages does the firm have to small business and other 
industrial institutions eg SBDC and IDC, or local government? 
Does the firm have any access at all to bank credit 
facilities? How does this impact on the running of the 
business? · 
If direct credit is not available, what strategies do 
entrepreneurs adopt to try to overcome this (eg by using 
prospective customers' deposits to obtain raw materials or 
cross subsidising projects)? 
How do these strategies impact on quality and delivery times 












How many employees are there? 
What is the skill distribution of these employees? 
Are skills broad-based? 
Does each worker specialise in a specific task or does job 
rotation take place? How are workers emplo_y;_e_,d,__an_d_w_h,....i ... c-h....--a_r_e_a_s_d~o---:"t ....... h_e_y_c_o_m_e___,.f_r_o_m-=?,___ 
What usable skills do workers start with? is the finn forced 
to take on a training role? If so, is it on-the-job, courses, 
etc? 
What type of wages accrue to skilled and semi-skilled labour? 
Other benefits? 
Does the finn follow any health and safety procedures? If so, 
please describe. 
OTHER PROBLEMS (eg threat fran inq:>orts etc), OTHER 
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